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The United States Constitution employs two basic methods 
for proposing constitutional amendments.1 Under the con-
gressional proposal method, two thirds of each house of 
Congress can propose a constitutional amendment. Under the 
convention method, the state legislatures can apply for a 
national convention that would then decide whether to propose 
a constitutional amendment. The amendments proposed under 
either of these two methods are then subject to ratification by 
the state legislatures or state conventions, as Congress 
determines. 
These amendment methods were designed to operate 
together to ensure that no one entity could prevent the 
enactment of an amendment. Thus, if Congress seeks an 
amendment that the state legislatures oppose, Congress can 
propose the amendment and task state conventions with the 
ratification decision. Similarly, if the state legislatures seek an 
amendment that Congress opposes, the state legislatures can 
apply for a convention that could propose the amendment, 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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which would then be subject to ratification either by the states 
legislatures or state conventions. 
Unfortunately, one of these two amendment methods is 
broken. The convention method simply does not work. Not only 
has it never been used to enact an amendment, but no 
convention has ever been called.2 This lack of use, moreover, 
cannot be attributed to a lack of political interest in enacting 
amendments that Congress opposes. In recent years, there has 
been strong political support for at least three proposed 
amendments that would reduce congressional power—a 
Balanced Budget Amendment, a Line Item Veto Amendment, 
and a Congressional Term Limits Amendment—but unsur-
prisingly, Congress has refused to propose any of these. Yet, the 
convention method has not been employed either to enact these 
amendments or even to call a convention.3 That the convention 
method is broken suggests that the Constitution now operates in 
a unbalanced way, allowing only amendments that promote 
congressional power, but not permitting amendments that 
constrain it.4 
 The most important reason why the convention method 
does not work is the fear of a runaway convention. To under-
stand this fear, imagine that two thirds of the state legislatures 
were to apply for a convention on a specific subject, such as 
restraining the federal government’s power to pass unbalanced 
budgets, and Congress were to call for a convention on that 
subject. The problem, however, is that the convention might 
choose to ignore this subject matter limitation and propose a 
different amendment—perhaps an amendment to authorize a 
constitutional right to same sex marriage or to prayer in the 
public schools. And that amendment might then be ratified by 
the three quarters of the states. A state legislator that sought a 
balanced budget amendment might, then, end up instead with an 
 
 2. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional 
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 734 (1993). 
 3. An effort has been made in the last several decades to apply for a convention to 
propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, with 32 of the requisite 34 states legislatures 
having applied at some time for a convention. But the state legislatures have never been 
willing to take the next step of satisfying the two thirds constitutional requirement for a 
convention, even though concerns about federal deficits have been great at various times 
in the last several decades. The fear of a runaway convention has simply been too great. 
See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE 
CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 161 (1988); Michael B. Rappaport, 
Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment 
Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1533 n.47 (2010).  
 4. See Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1526–55. 
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amendment providing either a constitutional right to same sex 
marriage or to prayer in the public schools—something that he 
or she might strongly oppose. The fear of such a runaway 
convention has led many to oppose use of the convention 
method.5 
While the failure of the convention method represents a 
significant constitutional defect, in this Article I argue that the 
defect results from the failure to follow the Constitution’s 
original meaning. I contend that the original meaning of the 
Constitution allows for limited conventions—conventions that 
are limited only to proposing amendments on specific subjects. 
Therefore, if the state legislatures apply for a convention limited 
solely to proposing an amendment that restrains the federal 
government’s power to pass unbalanced budgets, the convention 
would not be permitted to propose an amendment on other sub-
jects. The Constitution therefore forbids runaway conventions. 
To elaborate on my argument, I maintain that, once two 
thirds of the states apply for the same limited convention, 
Congress is obligated to call that limited convention. Moreover, 
the convention is required to conform to the limits in Congress’s 
call. If the convention were to violate the limitations in the call—
if it were to propose an amendment that was not within the 
scope of its authority—then that proposal would be uncon-
stitutional. It would not represent the type of proposal that is 
allowed by the Constitution and could not be legally ratified by 
the states. I also argue that the limitations on the convention can 
be quite strict. The Constitution allows the state legislatures to 
apply not merely for a convention limited to a specific subject 
matter. It also allows the state legislatures to draft a specially 
worded amendment and then to apply for a convention limited 
to deciding only whether to propose that amendment. 
Readers familiar with the literature on the convention 
method of constitutional amendment may be surprised by my 
conclusions. In the past, several leading constitutional scholars 
have argued that the Constitution does not permit the states or 
Congress to impose limits on a convention.6 And virtually no 
constitutional scholar has argued that a convention limited to a 
specifically worded amendment is constitutional. Yet, I argue 
that these past scholars have been mistaken. In part, the 
differences between my view and theirs turn on the fact that I 
 
 5. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 161; Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1533 n.47. 
 6. See infra Part III.  
!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012  3:19 PM 
2012] LIMITED CONVENTION 57 
 
seek to apply a rigorous original meaning analysis, whereas they 
have either invoked their own normative commitments or 
applied different or looser versions of originalism. But, in part, 
the differences are due to what I believe are mistaken inferences 
and interpretations of evidence. Finally, the differences may also 
be due to the fact that my analysis provides what is, to my 
knowledge, the first rigorous textual derivation of the right of 
the states to apply for a limited convention. 
Of course, showing that the Constitution’s original meaning 
authorizes limited conventions will not solve the defect in the 
convention method. To eliminate the possibility of a runaway 
convention, it is necessary that other constitutional actors, such 
as the Congress, the convention, and the courts, also conclude 
that the Constitution authorizes limited conventions. Without 
such agreement, these other constitutional actors might engage 
in or support a runaway convention. While showing that the 
original meaning authorizes limited conventions is therefore 
insufficient to eliminating the defect in the convention method, it 
is a first step in that direction. It is also important for assigning 
responsibility for this defect. This defect is not, as some would 
have it, the responsibility of the constitutional enactors who 
decided to employ an illimitable convention. Rather, the defect 
is the result of both nonoriginalists and originalists who have 
misread or ignored the original meaning. 
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the Con-
stitution’s two methods of proposing constitutional amendments: 
the congressional proposal method and the convention method. 
Part II then explains the two interpretations of the convention 
method: the limited convention view, which reads the 
Constitution as authorizing both limited and unlimited con-
ventions, and the unlimited convention view, which interprets it 
only to allow unlimited conventions. 
Part III then undertakes the task of deriving the limited 
convention view from the constitutional text. It argues, based on 
evidence from contemporary dictionaries, from other parts of 
the Constitution, from conventions existing at the time, and from 
other evidence of word usage, that the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s phrase a “Convention for proposing Amend-
ments” includes both limited and unlimited conventions. It also 
shows that the Constitution’s authorization of state legislatures 
to apply for a “Convention for proposing Amendments” allows 
them to apply for limited conventions. Part IV then explores 
arguments based on structure and purpose, concluding that they 
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also support the limited convention view. Finally, Part V 
addresses three arguments against the limited convention view—
that a convention was historically understood as illimitable, that 
the runaway Philadelphia Convention shows that the Framers 
believed that conventions were not subject to limitations, and 
that the debates at the Philadelphia Convention indicate that the 
Framers would have opposed limited conventions. This part 
rebuts each of these arguments, showing that none of them calls 
the limited convention view into question. 
I. ARTICLE V 
A. THE CONSTITUTION’S AMENDMENT PROVISIONS 
Article V of the Constitution describes in a single paragraph 
the various methods for amending the Constitution. It provides: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this 
Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid 
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made 
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.7 
Article V thus establishes a two step process for enacting an 
amendment: first an amendment is proposed and then it is 
ratified. There are also two ways of completing each step. An 
amendment can be proposed either by two thirds of each house 
of Congress or by two thirds of the state legislatures applying for 
Congress to call a convention that would draft an amendment. 
Similarly, an amendment can be ratified by three quarters of the 
states, either through their legislatures or through state 
conventions. Finally, Article V is modular: either of the proposal 
methods can be paired with either of the ratification methods. 
Article V’s purpose in providing alternative amendment 
methods is evident: to prevent a single government entity from 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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having a veto over the passage of an amendment. While 
Congress is given the authority to propose amendments, the 
convention method allows the nation to bypass Congress and 
propose amendments that constrain Congress’s powers. 
Similarly, while the state legislatures can ratify amendments, 
they might choose to reject amendments that constrain their 
powers. Therefore, the Constitution allows ratification by state 
conventions, which have different interests than the state 
legislatures.8 
This understanding of the congressional amendment process 
is supported by various statements made at the time of the 
founding. Thus, George Mason, in the Philadelphia Convention, 
argued that “It would be improper to require the consent of the 
Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and 
refuse their consent on that very account.”9 Similarly, James 
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43, Article V “equally enables 
the general and the State governments to originate the 
amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the 
experience on one side, or on the other.”10 In the New York 
legislature, Samuel Jones explained that the Framers “prescribed 
a mode by which Congress might procure more [power], if in the 
operation of the government it was found necessary; and they 
prescribed for the states a mode of restraining the powers of the 
[federal] government, if upon trial it should be found they had 
given too much.”11 Finally, at the North Carolina Ratifying 
Convention, in response to the claim that the introduction of 
amendments “depended altogether on Congress,” James Iredell 
replied “that it did not depend on the will of Congress; for the 
legislatures of two thirds of the states were authorized to make 
application for calling a convention for proposing amendments, 
and on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call 
such convention, so that they will have no option.”12 
 
 8. Article VII of the Constitution was adopted in part for a similar reason. Article 
VII, which provided that the Constitution would take effect when nine of the thirteen 
states, acting through state conventions, ratified it, used state conventions rather than 
state legislatures in part because it was believed that the state legislatures had interests 
that would lead them to oppose the new Constitution.  
 9. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 104–05 (W.H. Norton ed. 1987).  
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, AT 315 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961). 
 11. See 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 2522 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY].  
 12. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF 
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Although Article V thus purposefully provides four paths to 
amending the Constitution,13 the nation has almost always relied 
on only one of them: Congress proposes an amendment and the 
state legislatures ratify it. One time, for the 21st Amendment, 
Congress proposed the amendment but state conventions were 
used to ratify it.14 The one method that has never been employed 
is having a convention propose a constitutional amendment.15 
B. THE CONVENTION METHOD 
The convention method works quite differently than the 
congressional proposal method. Under the convention method, 
the state legislatures must apply for a convention. When two 
thirds of the states have applied, Congress must call a conven-
tion. The convention, then, must determine whether to propose 
a constitutional amendment. If it does propose an amendment, 
Congress must determine whether ratification should occur by 
state legislatures or state conventions. 
In part because the convention method has never been 
used, there are various questions about the constitutional rules 
that govern this amendment method, including questions as to 
who selects the convention delegates and the content and origin 
of the rules that govern the convention.16 But the most important 
question about the convention method for our purposes is 
whether the Constitution authorizes limited conventions. 
An unlimited convention is a convention that has no limits 
placed on it by the state legislatures.17 The convention can 
 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 178 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES].  
 13. For additional statements expressing similar concerns, see An Old Whig, 13 
DOCUMENTARY HIST. 316, 377 (“We shall never find two thirds of a Congress voting or 
proposing anything which shall derogate from their own authority and importance.”); A 
Plebeian, An Address to the People of the State of New York, Apr. 17, 1788, reprinted in 
20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 942, 944 (arguing that “those who enjoy these powers” are 
unlikely “to surrender” them).  
 14. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 126.  
 15. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 734. 
 16. See Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: 
Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 696–97 (2011). 
 17. A convention that was limited by Congress would also be a limited convention. 
But a convention limited by Congress alone, without a limitation sought in the prior 
applications of the state legislatures, would be clearly unconstitutional. See infra notes 
63–66 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on Congress’s powers). Therefore, 
when I discuss limited conventions, I will mean a convention where the limitations are 
initially contained in the state applications and only then placed in the call of the 
convention by Congress.  
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propose an amendment on any subject it desires, subject to 
constitutional constraints. In contrast, a limited convention is a 
convention that is limited as to scope by applications from the 
state legislatures. One can distinguish between the two types of 
limited conventions. First, one can imagine a convention limited 
to a subject, such as to financial matters. While this convention is 
allowed discretion to decide what amendments to propose in the 
financial area, it is not allowed to propose amendments that are 
non-financial. Second, one can imagine a convention that is 
limited to a specifically worded amendment. In this situation, the 
state legislatures would have specified a particular amendment 
in their applications and the convention’s duties would be 
limited to deciding whether or not to propose that amendment. 
We can call these two types of limited conventions, respectively, 
“a convention limited as to subject” and “a convention limited to 
a specifically worded amendment.” 
II. THE CONTENDING VIEWS: LIMITED AND 
UNLIMITED CONVENTIONS 
There are two basic views about whether the Constitution 
allows limited conventions. One position holds that limited 
conventions are constitutional. Under this limited convention 
view, if the states apply for a limited convention, then Congress 
is required to call for such a convention and the convention is 
permitted to propose only amendments within the scope 
authorized by the applications of the state legislatures. Any 
proposals that the convention makes on other matters are illegal. 
One can further divide this basic limited convention view based 
on the type of limited convention. Thus, one might hold the 
limited convention view only for conventions limited to a 
subject.18 Or one might go further and also hold the limited 
convention view as to conventions limited to a specifically 
worded amendment.19 Under this latter view, if the states seek a 
convention limited not merely to a particular subject but to a 
 
 18. See Philip B. Kurland, A Bill to Provide Procedures for Calling Constitutional 
Conventions for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, on 
Application of the Legislatures of Two-Thirds of the States, Pursuant to Article V of the 
Constitution, 90th Cong. 233–34 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Hearings] (memorandum from 
Philip Kurland to Senator Sam J. Ervin); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment 
and the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REV. 949, 953–57 (1968); Sam J. Ervin, 
Jr., Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the 
Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 884 (1968). 
 19. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Convention—The 
Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985, 990–91 (1979).  
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specifically worded amendment, the convention is limited to 
deciding whether to propose that specific amendment. 
The alternative position holds that the Constitution does 
not recognize limited conventions. Under this unlimited 
convention view, a convention can never be limited as to the 
amendments it can propose.20 Thus, if the states apply for a 
limited convention, Congress would not even be authorized to 
call a convention, because there would be no applications for the 
only constitutional type of convention—an unlimited conven-
tion.21 
This unlimited convention view has been held by many of 
the leading scholars of constitutional law over the last 40 years, 
including Bruce Ackerman, Charles Black, Walter Dellinger, 
Gerald Gunther, and Michael Paulsen.22 Despite the illustrious 
reputations of these scholars, I do not believe their arguments 
are persuasive from an original meaning perspective. The 
problem is in part that their methodology does not track that of 
modern originalism, but it is also the nature of their arguments. 
In the next two Parts, I argue in favor of the strongest 
version of the limited convention view—that states may seek 
either a convention limited to a subject or a convention limited 
to a specially worded amendment.23 In making my argument, I 
focus on the original public meaning of Article V. I leave aside, 
for the most part, arguments based on alternative interpretive 
 
 20. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a 
Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1972) [hereinafter Black 1972]; Walter E. Dellinger, 
The Recurring Question of the “Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 
1624 (1979); Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States 
Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 6–11 (1979); Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738 (“[T]here can 
be no such thing as a ‘limited’ constitutional convention.”); Bruce Ackerman, 
Unconstitutional Convention, The New Republic, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8. 
 21. Some advocates of the unlimited convention view take a flexible view about the 
meaning of state applications. According to this approach, some state applications that 
appear to be applying for a limited convention are reasonably interpreted as also 
applying for an unlimited convention, if Congress concludes that a limited convention is 
not legal. If two-thirds of the state legislatures made such an application, then this 
approach would require that Congress call an unlimited convention. See Pauslen, supra 
note 2, at 738.  
 22. See supra notes 2, 20.  
 23. It is worth noting that the name “limited convention view” is a bit misleading. 
There is nothing under this view that requires that a limited convention be called. If the 
state legislatures decide that the circumstances warrant it, they can apply for Congress to 
call an unlimited convention. In this sense, one might call the limited convention view the 
state legislative discretion view, since it allows the state legislatures to decide on the type 
of convention. But I shall stick to the terminology of “the limited convention view” and 
“the unlimited convention view” because of its greater transparency.  
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theories, although I do rebut a few influential arguments based 
on original intent.24 
While not all constitutional interpreters are originalists, this 
paper nonetheless is of more general interest than it might at 
first seem. First, many scholars who do not regard themselves as 
originalists still believe the Constitution’s original meaning is 
relevant to the Constitution’s proper interpretation, even if it is 
not determinative. Second, original meaning analysis tends to be 
most influential in areas where long standing precedents do not 
exist. This is the case regarding the convention method. 
III. THE LIMITED CONVENTION VIEW: TEXT 
The limited convention view derives supports from several 
types of evidence—evidence of text, historical usage, and 
structure and purpose. It also gains power from weaknesses in 
the unlimited convention view. This Part focuses on text and 
historical usage. 
The initial challenge is to show that the limited convention 
view can be derived from the constitutional text. The text of 
Article V provides that “The Congress . . . on the Application of 
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention for proposing Amendments.”25 The limited conven-
tion view must derive three conclusions from the text: it must 
show that two thirds of the state legislatures can apply for 
Congress to call a limited convention, that Congress must then 
call a limited convention, and that the convention must conform 
to that call. 
The unlimited convention view is obviously skeptical about 
this possibility. In fact, that view claims to read the text as 
straightforwardly precluding limited conventions. Under the 
unlimited convention view, it is thought that the language “a 
Convention for proposing Amendments” suggests a convention 
that can propose whatever amendments it likes.26 Consequently, 
the view maintains that there is no textual basis for inferring 
power in the state legislatures or Congress to limit what the 
convention may consider. 
Despite these arguments, I maintain that, once one 
examines the text, one can see that the elements of the limited 
 
 24. See infra Part V.C.  
 25. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 26. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738. 
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convention view can be derived from it and, in fact, that the text 
represents a brief and elegant way of communicating these 
elements. Advocates of the limited convention view have not 
previously derived these conclusions from the text, but I 
undertake that task here. 
In particular, I argue that the three elements of the limited 
convention view—that two thirds of the state legislatures can 
apply for Congress to call a limited convention, that Congress 
must then call a limited convention, and that the convention 
must conform to that call—can be derived from the text in three 
steps. First, “a Convention for proposing Amendments” is broad 
enough to cover not merely unlimited conventions but also 
limited conventions. Put differently, a limited convention is one 
type of “Convention for proposing Amendments.” Second, if 
Congress can call a limited convention, then the language 
certainly suggests that the convention should conform to the 
limitations of that call. Because the convention derives its 
authority to meet from the call, it must respect the limitations in 
that call as well. Third, the language allowing the states to apply 
for Congress to call a convention also obligates Congress to call 
a limited convention. When two thirds of the states submit 
applications for an unlimited convention, that obligates Congress 
to call that convention. Similarly, when two thirds of the states 
submit applications for a limited convention, that also obligates 
Congress to call that limited convention. 
I shall discuss each of these three steps in turn. I begin with 
the meaning of a “Convention for proposing Amendments.” 
A. A CONVENTION FOR PROPOSING AMENDMENTS. 
The Constitution provides that upon the application of two 
thirds of the state legislature, the Congress shall call a 
“Convention for proposing Amendments.” The question here is 
what the Constitution means by the phrase a “Convention for 
proposing Amendments” and in particular whether such a con-
vention includes a limited convention. Here, I argue that the 
evidence bearing on the original meaning of the phrase strongly 
suggests that a limited convention is such a “Convention for 
proposing Amendments.” 
The unlimited convention view argues that the term 
“propose” suggests that a convention for proposing amendments 
is unlimited. But I show that the term “propose” did not imply 
an unlimited power of the convention to endorse any constitu-
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tional provision of its choosing. First, I show, based on evidence 
from contemporary dictionaries and other usages in the 
Constitution, that the term merely meant the power to authorize 
an amendment to be sent to the states. Second, I then focus on a 
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, showing 
that nothing about a convention suggests the power to consider 
alternatives. Finally, I discuss the contrary arguments of Charles 
Black, perhaps the leading scholar of the unlimited convention 
view, arguing that they cannot be reconciled with the evidence of 
the original meaning. 
 1. The Proposal Power as the Power to Offer for Adoption 
The meaning of the phrase a “Convention for proposing 
Amendments” is best understood as referring to a convention 
that has the power to formally propose amendments that are 
then eligible to be ratified by the states. Under the 
Constitution’s two amendment methods—the congressional 
proposal method and the convention method—the Constitution 
provides for two essential steps. One entity formally proposes an 
amendment. A second entity then formally decides whether to 
ratify that amendment. The entity with the power to propose is 
the only entity that can take the first essential step of proposing 
the amendment. And only an amendment that has been formally 
proposed can be sent to the states for the second essential step of 
ratification. Thus, the power possessed by the proposing 
convention is the power to approve an amendment that can then 
be sent to the states for ratification. 
This understanding of propose is supported by the ordinary 
meaning of the term when the Constitution was enacted. The 
first edition of Webster’s Dictionary, for example, has as its first 
definition, “To offer for consideration, discussion, acceptance or 
adoption; as, to propose a bill or resolve to a legislative body.”27 
The meaning that I employ accords with this definition: to offer 
for adoption. The proposing convention has the formal power to 
offer an amendment for adoption by the ratifiers. The ratifers, 
then, have the power to adopt the amendment. 
 
 27. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(New York, S. Converse 1828). Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 defines “propose” as “[t]o 
offer to the consideration” and as a “[s]cheme or design propounded to consideration or 
acceptance.” 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(London, W. Strahan 1755). 
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This meaning of propose is also followed in other parts of 
the Constitution. Article V provides that “The Congress, 
whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . .”28 This 
meaning of propose is exactly the same as that used for the 
proposing convention. If two thirds of both houses approve an 
amendment, it is formally proposed and can then be sent to the 
states for ratification. 
Similarly, the Constitution provides in Article I, section 7, 
clause 1, that “All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the 
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or 
concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”29 The term 
“propose” here once again involves the formal power to offer for 
adoption. Suppose the Senate receives a revenue bill from the 
House and then decides to amend it. The Senate then will pass 
the amended revenue bill and send it back to the house. This 
revenue bill is then formally proposed by the Senate. If the 
House passes the exact revenue bill proposed by the Senate, 
then it is enacted by the Congress and sent to the President. 
Thus, the Senate’s power to propose revenue bills is similar to 
the powers of Congress and the convention to propose 
amendments. In these cases, the power is to offer a specific 
measure for adoption by another body. 
This understanding of the proposing convention also makes 
perfect sense if we understand the historical context when the 
Constitution was written. As I show below in my review of the 
history of conventions,30 when the Constitution was enacted 
many different types of conventions existed. Some conventions 
were enacting conventions—they had the power to draft and 
enact a constitution or constitutional provision on their own. 
Other conventions were ratifying conventions, ratifying a 
constitution or constitutional provision drafted by another 
entity. Still other conventions were proposing conventions that 
recommended provisions that another entity had to enact. Given 
the variety of conventions, it was important for the Constitution 
to clearly indicate the type of conventions that were being 
employed. The language of Article V does that well. Thus, the 
constitutional language clearly speaks of state conventions that 
only ratify amendments. And, most importantly for our 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 30. See infra Part V.A.  
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purposes, the language, “a convention for proposing amend-
ments,” clearly indicates that the proposing convention only has 
the power to propose and cannot enact anything on its own.31 
Thus, one need not reach for other possible meanings of a 
proposing convention (such as the power to exercise discretion 
over what amendments to propose) to find a purpose for the 
language. Its primary purpose is to clarify that the convention 
has only the power to offer an amendment for adoption by the 
states. 
To move now to the key issue, this meaning of “propose” 
indicates that a convention for proposing amendments can be 
either a limited or unlimited convention. Certainly, an unlimited 
convention would be a convention for proposing amendments. 
Such a convention could decide on what amendment to pass and 
that amendment would be formally proposed. It could then be 
sent to the states for ratification. 
But both types of limited conventions would also be 
conventions for proposing amendments. Even in the case of a 
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, the 
convention would make the decision whether to propose that 
amendment. If it passes that amendment, then the amendment is 
formally proposed and can be sent to the states for ratification. If 
the convention does not pass the amendment, then it is not 
proposed and cannot can be sent to the states for ratification. 
The convention limited to a specifically worded amendment thus 
has the power to offer an amendment for adoption by the 
ratifiers and is therefore a proposing convention. 
Finally, this definition of a proposing convention is also 
supported by the fact that limited conventions were well known 
to the Constitution’s enactors. Perhaps, the most obvious limited 
proposing convention was the Philadelphia Convention itself. 
The Congress under the Articles had called for the Philadelphia 
Convention “for the sole and express purpose of revising the 
Articles of Confederation” and “when agreed to in Congress, 
and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution 
adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation 
 
 31. Not only is it forbidden from enacting constitutional amendments, it also cannot 
enact legislation, as some conventions of various kinds had done or sought to do. See 
JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND LEGISLATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; ITS 
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING §§ 123–38 (Chicago, E.B. Meyers 2d 
ed. 1869) (discussing the general legislative powers of individual state conventions at the 
time of the framing).  
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of the Union.”32 This call was limited, because it was intended for 
the convention to propose revisions that would employ the 
amendment procedure in the Articles, a procedure which 
required approval by the Congress and the state legislatures.33 
The Annapolis Convention, which had preceded the 
Philadelphia Convention, was also a limited convention. The call 
for the Annapolis Convention, circulated by Virginia, had stated 
that the convention would propose measures relating to 
commerce.34 
State constitutions also appear to have authorized limited 
conventions. In particular, the Georgia Constitution of 1777 
provided: 
No alteration shall be made in this constitution without 
petitions from a majority of the counties, and the petitions 
from each county to be signed by a majority of voters in each 
county within this State; at which time the assembly shall 
order a convention to be called for that purpose, specifying 
the alterations to be made, according to the petitions 
preferred to the assembly by the majority of the counties as 
aforesaid.35 
Although there are other possible interpretations,36 the most 
obvious and, in my view, the best interpretation of this provision 
is that it limits conventions to deciding whether to adopt the 
alterations recommended by the petitioning counties.37 After all, 
the provision states that the “assembly shall order a convention 
to be called . . . specifying the alterations to be made according to 
the petitions.” Other state constitutions also employed 
conventions limited to ratifying the decisions proposed by 
 
 32. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 480 (letter from the Hon. Robert Yates 
and the Hon. John Lansing). 
 33. The Philadelphia Convention, however, became a runaway convention when it 
proposed a Constitution that adopted a different ratification procedure. For discussion of 
why this does not count against the limited convention view, see infra Part V.B. 
 34. Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia 153 (Jan. 
21, 1786); CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
 35. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII. 
 36. It might be argued that the provision merely required the convention to receive 
the proposed alterations from the majority of the counties, but allowed the convention to 
ignore them and enact others. But this seems to conflict with the language of the provi-
sion, which states that the “assembly shall order a convention to be called . . . specifying 
the alterations to be made according to the petitions.” The language does not say, 
“specifying some of the alterations that should be considered by the convention.” 
 37. Interestingly, this provision of the Georgia Constitution was never used. On its 
own authority, the Georgia legislature called a convention to draft a new constitution in 
1788. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 15. For a discussion of how this authority might be 
understood, see infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text. 
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others.38 Finally, there were also numerous limited interstate 
conventions held in the period between Independence and the 
Constitution.39 Although these conventions were directed 
towards interstate relations such as trade and the war rather than 
constitutions, they were nonetheless referred to as conventions 
and had much in common with the Philadelphia Convention.40 
Finally, if the constitutional enactors allowed limited 
conventions, one might wonder why they did not indicate more 
specifically that a convention could be limited. But this question 
is easily answered. The constitutional language needed to be 
broad enough to extend to applications not merely for limited 
conventions but also for unlimited ones. After all, the Framers 
would certainly have desired that unlimited conventions be 
permitted, since there is no reason to believe that the states 
always would have been able to agree on a subject or 
amendment, especially given the limited deliberation among 
states in a world with poor communication technology. But the 
fact that the states might not always be able to agree on a subject 
or amendment does not mean that they never could have. Thus, 
to permit state legislative requests both for limited and unlimited 
conventions, the Constitution speaks in neutral terms of a 
convention for proposing amendments and of a process whereby 
the states apply for, and Congress calls, such a convention. 
Given the Constitution’s brevity, the language here of a 
“Convention for proposing Amendments” makes sense as a 
simple and straightforward way of expressing a more 
complicated idea. 
If, then, the phrase a “Convention for proposing 
Amendments” has a general meaning that includes any type of 
convention that can propose an amendment, one should 
understand that phrase as the equivalent of what might be 
communicated in longer and more specific language. The 
language here should be understood as shorthand for a provision 
stating that “The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legis-
latures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a 
Convention” either for proposing amendments of its own 
 
 38. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; VT. CONST. of 1786, § XL. 
 39. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 17–19; Natelson, supra note 16, at 717–19 
(discussing these conventions).  
 40. These conventions were similar to the Philadelphia Convention most 
importantly in that they were conventions of multiple states that were tasked with 
proposing new arrangements that would affect those states and their proposals would 
only go into effect if approved by those states. 
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choosing, for proposing amendments regarding a subject, or for 
proposing a specific amendment.41  
 2. A Convention Limited to a Specifically Worded  
Amendment 
Although I have argued in favor of the limited convention 
view generally, the issue of conventions limited to a specifically 
worded amendment requires additional attention, since such 
conventions are more controversial. Several commentators have 
argued in favor of the constitutionality of conventions limited to 
a subject, but against the constitutionality of conventions limited 
to a specifically worded amendment.42 
The principal argument used against the constitutionality of 
conventions limited to a specifically worded amendment is that 
they would deprive the convention of its opportunity to exercise 
discretion over what specific amendment to pass. This limitation 
on the convention’s discretion is said to be inconsistent with it 
being a convention for proposing amendments.43 It is also argued 
that limiting the convention to a specifically worded amendment 
would turn it into a ratification convention.44 
Although these arguments have been persuasive to some 
advocates of the limited convention view, they have little basis in 
the Constitution’s original meaning. There is nothing in the 
meaning of the constitutional terms “convention’ or “a conven-
tion for proposing amendments” that requires a convention to 
have a choice between different specific amendments. Put 
differently, a convention can be limited as to whether or not to 
propose a specific amendment and still be a convention. 
It is true that certain conventions at the time of the 
Constitution were given significant discretion as to what 
 
 41. That Article V speaks of a convention for proposing “Amendments” rather 
than “an Amendment” surely does not affect the correctness of this interpretation. A 
limited convention could be restricted to two (or more) subjects or two (or more) specific 
amendments. Moreover, the enactors needed to use language broad enough to cover 
conventions that proposed either one or multiple amendments, and the plural was more 
suited to that task. A convention for proposing amendments would be permitted to 
propose a single amendment; a convention for proposing an amendment might not be 
allowed to propose multiple amendments. 
 42. See, e.g., 1967 Hearings, supra note 18, at 233–34; Bonfield, supra note 18, at 
953–57; Ervin, supra note 18, at 884; Natelson, supra note 16, at 732. The main 
commentator I am aware of who endorses conventions limited to a specific subject is 
William Van Alstyne. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 990–91; Gunther, supra note 20, 
at 6 n.15 (noting Van Alstyne’s view). 
 43. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 18, at 953–54.  
 44. Bonfield, supra note 18, at 955. 
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constitutional provisions to propose or enact. But the question is 
not whether some conventions had discretion. Rather, it is 
whether all conventions must have discretion and, most 
importantly, whether a proposing convention must have 
discretion. The answer to these questions is no. 
It is clear from the Constitution itself that conventions need 
not possess such discretion. The Constitution employs two type 
of conventions that were given no discretion: state conventions 
that may be employed to ratify amendments and the original 
state conventions called to ratify the original Constitution. 
Clearly, ratification conventions do not have discretion over 
what measures to enact. They are required to make a single yes-
or-no decision. Of course, that does not make them unimportant, 
since they decide whether a proposed amendment will be 
enacted. 
If conventions generally do not necessarily need to confer 
discretion, then what about proposing conventions? Is there 
something about the proposing power that requires such 
conventions to possess discretion? The commentators discussed 
above assume that the activity of proposing a constitutional 
amendment requires that conventions have discretion. After all, 
they might ask, what is it that a proposing convention does other 
than deciding what amendment to propose? 
But this argument is mistaken. Although the proposing 
convention contemplated by Article V will sometimes have 
discretion (such as when the states apply for an unlimited 
convention or a convention limited to a subject), there is nothing 
about the concept of a proposing convention in Article V that 
requires discretion. As we have seen, the Constitution’s use of the 
phrase a “Convention for proposing Amendments” refers 
merely to a convention that has the authority to offer an amend-
ment for adoption by the states through ratification. There is 
nothing in the phrase that requires discretion. 
The other argument against the constitutionality of a 
convention limited to a specifically worded amendment—that it 
is the equivalent of a ratification convention—is also not 
persuasive. It is true that such a limited proposing convention 
will be restricted to an up-or-down vote on an amendment, just 
like a ratification convention is. But that the two conventions 
share a common attribute does not mean they are identical for 
constitutional purposes. The question is whether a convention 
limited to a specifically worded amendment meets the 
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constitutional definition of a proposing or a ratification con-
vention. As I have been arguing, such a convention meets the 
definition of a proposing convention, because it has the power to 
offer an amendment for adoption by the states. By contrast, it 
does not meet the definition of a ratification convention, which 
is a convention that has the authority to ratify or enact an 
amendment proposed by another body. 
 3. Charles Black’s Arguments for the Unlimited 
Convention View 
Given these strong arguments for interpreting a proposing 
convention to allow for limited conventions, what then are the 
arguments against this conclusion? The principal textual and 
structural arguments have been made by Charles Black. Black 
argues that a “Convention for proposing Amendments” means a 
“a convention for proposing such amendments as to that 
convention seem suitable for being proposed.”45 I discuss Black’s 
principal textual and structural arguments in turn. 
  a. Text 
Black’s textual argument derives from the meaning of 
Congress’s power to propose amendments in Article V. Article 
V authorizes “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both 
Houses shall deem it necessary, [to] propose Amendments.”46 
Black claims that this power is essentially unlimited, entailing 
“choice among the whole range of alternatives, as to substance 
and wording.”47 He then claims that “[i]t is very doubtful 
whether the same word two lines later [referring to “a 
convention for proposing amendments”] . . . ought to be taken to 
denote a mechanical take-it-or-leave-it process.”48 Thus, Black’s 
argues that “a convention for proposing amendments” allows the 
convention essentially unlimited authority to propose 
amendments because Congress enjoys that same authority under 
its authority to propose amendments.49 
Black’s argument about the meaning of propose, however, 
cannot bear the weight that he places on it. It is true that 
 
 45. Black 1972, supra note 20, at 196. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 47. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened 
Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 962 (1963) [hereinafter Black 1963]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Amendment by National Constitutional Convention: A 
Letter to a Senator, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 626, 630 (1979) [hereinafter Black 1979]. 
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Congress has great discretion to decide what amendments to 
propose, but that does not indicate that this discretion derives 
from the power to propose. There is an obvious alternative 
explanation for this result. Article V gives to Congress the power 
to propose amendments without involving any other entity. 
Thus, the Constitution does not authorize any significant limits 
on Congress’s proposing power. By contrast, the proposing 
convention is given the power to propose amendments only if 
the states apply for a convention and Congress calls it. If one 
assumes, as I argue in the next section, that the states can apply 
for a limited convention, then that explains why the Congress 
has great discretion to propose what amendments it likes and the 
proposing convention might be limited as to what it can propose: 
the Constitution gives the state legislatures the power to limit 
the scope of the convention’s proposing power, but it does not 
give anyone the power to limit Congress’s proposing power. 
Although Congress’s proposing power can easily be 
explained by the limited convention view, Black’s unlimited 
convention view has great difficulty with the evidence of the 
original meaning that I have supplied. Black’s view cannot 
account for the ordinary meaning of “propose” at the time of the 
Constitution, which did not indicate that the power was 
unlimited. He also has a hard time accounting for the limited 
proposing conventions that were known to the Framers. 
Moreover, Black’s interpretation of a “Convention for 
proposing Amendments” does not even appear consistent with 
the remainder of Article V. A few lines later in Article V, it 
provides that after an amendment is proposed, the amendment 
shall be a valid part of the Constitution when ratified by three 
quarters of the state legislatures or state conventions, “as the 
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress.”50 This use of “propose” is clearly inconsistent with an 
unlimited discretion to make choices. Rather, Congress is limited 
to a choice between two alternatives: ratification by state 
legislatures or state conventions. Clearly, the constitutional 
authors did not understand the term “propose” to imply 
unlimited discretion.51 
 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).  
 51. It should be noted that this usage of “propose” may not be the same one that is 
employed in the earlier part of Article V (where “propose” meant “the power to offer 
for adoption”). This usage of “propose” allows Congress to make an authoritative choice 
as to which ratification method to use, whereas the usage of “propose” employed earlier 
in Article V allows Congress and the convention merely to approve an amendment for 
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But there is even clearer evidence that Black’s 
understanding of propose is mistaken. In the next section, I 
discuss a prior version of Article V offered by James Madison. 
That version provided that “Congress . . . on the application of 
two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States shall propose 
amendments to this Constitution.”52 As I will show, it is plain 
that, if two thirds of the state legislatures applied for a 
specifically worded amendment, Congress was required to 
propose that amendment. Thus, the provision shows clearly that 
the word “propose” did not mean an unlimited or discretionary 
power to draft a provision. Instead, its meaning cohered 
perfectly with the ordinary language meaning I have supplied 
here: to offer a provision or matter for adoption.53 
 
someone else to ratify. Here, Congress is not offering for adoption, but instead making a 
decision.  
It is not clear why the Philadelphia Convention used this language differently. There 
are two possibilities. First, the drafters might have been focused on the question whether 
the amendment would be ratified, which was uncertain, rather than on the ratification 
method, which Congress could decide. One might think of this as a case of the drafters 
using language imprecisely. Yet, it is also possible to argue that the drafters were not 
being sloppy. Instead, one might say that a mode of ratification was successful only if the 
ratification actually occurred. In that event, the proposed mode of ratification was 
adopted only if the ratification was successful. Second, it is possible that the Framers 
were using another sense of “propose,” which meant “to lay schemes.” See WEBSTER, 
supra note 27 (offering one definition of “propose” as “to lay schemes”). But this usage 
would be a bit awkward. A scheme or intent is not something that is necessarily realized 
in the real world; it is not an authorized choice. But even if this usage of “propose” is 
being employed here, it may still have relevance for understanding the earlier usage in 
Article V. After all, a scheme or plan might be deemed, based on the analysis employed 
by Black, to be unlimited. Normally, one has discretion to devise any scheme. That 
Congress is limited to choosing between two alternatives suggests that “propose” in this 
related sense can be limited. Thus, neither of the senses of “propose” would necessarily 
involve unlimited choice, even though often one has discretion as to what matters to 
propose. 
 52. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 602 (Max Farrand 
ed. 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
 53. Charles Black also offers another textual argument. He imagines that a state 
legislature submits an application that simply requests “that Congress call a convention 
for proposing amendments—the exact language of Article V.” Black, 1979, supra note 
49, at 629–31. He then argues that this application is for an unlimited convention and 
concludes that the constitutional language therefore appears to refer only to such a 
convention. But Black’s argument does not show that the constitutional language is 
referring only to an unlimited convention. It is true that a state legislature’s application 
for “a convention for proposing amendments” is properly interpreted as applying for an 
unlimited convention. But that is not because the phrase has only that meaning. Rather, 
because the state legislature has not specified a subject for the convention, it is 
reasonably interpreted as seeking an unlimited convention. But if the state legislature 
had applied for a convention for proposing amendments regarding debt limitation, that 
would have been a perfectly grammatical and sensible way of seeking a limited 
convention. Thus, Black’s argument, when properly pursued, leads to the conclusion that 
a convention for proposing amendments can be either a limited or unlimited convention. 
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Black’s mistake here appears to involve confusing an 
accidental attribute of the power to propose with an essential 
attribute. It is true that the act of proposing often involves 
significant discretion, but that is because in most circumstances 
proposals are not limited by rules. That the power to propose 
often includes such discretion does not mean that it always 
does.54 
  b. Structure and Relation 
In addition to his textual argument, Black also makes an 
argument based on structure and relation. Black contends that if 
the proposing convention is unlimited, a national institution will 
be proposing the constitutional amendment.55 That national 
insitution can treat a “national problem . . . as a problem, with a 
wide range of possible solutions and an opportunity to raise and 
discuss them all . . . .”56 In this respect, an unlimited convention 
would be similar to the congressional proposal method, which 
allows another national institution the opportunity to propose a 
solution to a national problem. By contrast, if the convention 
were a limited convention—especially if it were a convention 
limited to a specifically worded amendment—then the proposed 
solution to the national problem would have originated with the 
state legislatures. Black contends that the unlimited convention 
view should be preferred because it allows a nationally 
formulated solution and because it accords with the con-
gressional proposal method.57 
It is certainly true that limited conventions allow a national 
institution—the convention—less power to formulate a solution 
than do unlimited conventions. But that does not suggest that 
limited conventions were not intended by the constitutional 
enactors for two reasons. First, while the constitutional enactors 
would certainly not have wanted the state legislatures to be able 
 
 54. To take an example from modern language, which appears to follow the 18th 
century usage, suppose that a House Committee Chair is deciding on what legislation to 
propose. Under the rules of the Committee, he has the power to propose legislation for 
the committee that a majority of the committee has affirmed. Suppose further that the 
committee has affirmed bills A and B. Now, if the Chair were to ask his staff whether he 
should propose A or B, no one would suggest that he is using language incorrectly, even 
though his choice was limited. Moreover, if he announced to the House, that under the 
committee rules, he was proposing for the committee bill A, once again, no one would 
suggest he was misusing the language. The power to propose often includes significant 
discretion, but it is not required by the language.  
 55. See Black 1963, supra note 47, at 963; Black 1979, supra note 49, at 630. 
 56. See Black 1963, supra note 47, at 963. 
 57. Id.; Black 1979, supra note 49, at 630. 
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to amend the Constitution without being checked by a national 
entity, neither type of limited convention does that. Even if the 
state legislatures apply for a convention limited to a specifically 
worded amendment, the national convention would have the 
power to reject that amendment. Thus, a national entity could 
block an excessively parochial amendment.58 
Second, there is no reason to assume that the constitutional 
enactors would have always preferred a nationally developed 
solution. They already had such an arrangement from the 
congressional proposal method. Moreover, the state legislatures 
would only apply for a limited convention if there were wide 
agreement, from two thirds of the state legislatures, that a 
particular solution was required. If the state legislatures could 
reach such an agreement, it is not clear why it would be 
necessary to have a national institution formulate a proposal. 
Indeed, if the state legislatures could agree on a solution, 
then the convention method would be very much like a mirror 
image of the arrangement under the congressional proposal 
method. Under the congressional proposal method, the national 
government formulates an amendment and the states decide 
whether to adopt it. Here, the state legislatures formulate an 
amendment and the national convention decides whether to 
approve that amendment (with the states, of course, ratifying it 
as well). 
Although Black assumes that the Framers would have 
desired that both amendment methods employ a national 
institution to formulate the amendment, one can just as strongly 
argue that they would have a preferred a more pluralistic system. 
Just as the Framers enacted two amendment methods—one 
relying on Congress, the other not—so they might have wanted 
the power to formulate an amendment to be placed at the 
national level under one method and at the state level (to the 
extent feasible) under the other method. This might be more in 
accord with the constitutional structure as well as being more 
desirable. 
 
 58. Moreover, even if the national convention did somehow approve a parochial 
amendment, the Congress, a national entity, could still act against it. It could require that 
the amendment be ratified by state conventions rather than state legislatures, and 
therefore ensure that another body that was independent of the state legislatures would 
make the ratification decision. 
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B. THE APPLICATIONS OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES FOR  
A CONVENTION 
This brings us to the second basic question. If a convention 
for proposing amendments can include a limited convention, can 
the states apply for one? There are two issues here. First, does 
the Constitution allow the state legislatures to apply for a limited 
convention? Second, if the Constitution does allow the state 
legislatures to make such an application, does it also require 
Congress to follow that application and call a limited 
convention? 
 1. State Legislative Application for a Limited Convention 
I have argued that a “Convention for proposing Amend-
ments” is a phrase that covers both limited and unlimited 
conventions. The question now is whether the states have the 
power to apply for a limited convention. Since the Constitution 
authorizes two thirds of the state legislatures to apply for a 
convention for proposing amendments, and a limited convention 
is one such convention for proposing amendments, the only way 
that the states would lack the power to apply for a limited 
convention is if there is something in Article V that would limit 
their power. But, to the contrary, the language of Article V 
strongly suggests that the states have this power. 
First, the ordinary meaning of the term “application” 
supports this understanding. At the time of the Constitution, an 
application was a request made for something, as a request or 
solicitation to a court.59 This term, then, did not contain any 
limitation in it that would suggest that an application for a 
convention could only be of a certain kind. Instead, an 
application involved a request by the applicant and presumably 
the applicant would decide what he wanted to request in the 
application. Of course, this is not to say that the applicant could 
apply for something he was not entitled to apply for. For 
example, the states could not apply for a convention that would 
enact constitutional amendments on its own authority. But since 
a limited convention is one type of a convention for proposing 
amendments, the state legislatures are entitled to apply for such 
limited conventions. Thus, the ordinary meaning of application 
suggests that the state legislatures can apply for limited 
conventions. 
 
 59. WEBSTER, supra note 27 (“The act of making request or soliciting; as, he made 
application to a court of chancery”) (emphasis in original); JOHNSON, supra note 27. 
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Second, this understanding of application also appears to be 
supported by the only other use of “application” in the 
Constitution. The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, which 
is the constitutional neighbor of Article V, provides: “The 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence.”60 
The Clause thus requires the federal government to 
guarantee each state a republican form of government and to 
protect each state against invasion. But the federal government 
is only allowed to protect the states against domestic violence on 
the application of the legislature (or the executive when the 
legislature cannot be convened). The evident purpose of this 
provision reflects two concerns: It allows the states to receive the 
support of the federal government to protect against domestic 
violence, but it prevents the federal government from acting 
without a prior request of the state. It appears that the 
constitutional enactors believed that domestic violence might 
give the federal government an excuse to intervene in a state and 
to act against a group that the federal government disliked. 
Despite the Clause’s clear purpose, a question might arise 
about how the term “application” should be interpreted. There 
are two possible meanings, corresponding to the two possible 
meanings of “application” in Article V. On the one hand, a state 
legislature might have the power make an application for 
“limited” protection against domestic violence. Alternatively, a 
state legislature might possess only the power to make an 
application for protection generally. Suppose, for example, that 
there is domestic violence in the eastern part of Virginia 
concerning a tax revolt by debtors. The Virginia Legislature 
makes an application to the federal government for protection 
against the tax revolt in its two most eastern counties. Then, 
while the federal government is subduing the revolt, there is a 
violent dispute between farmers and ranchers in the western part 
of the state. The Virginia legislature, however, believes it can 
address the matter and does not ask for federal assistance. But 
the federal government believes that Virginia is in danger and 
seeks to protect them anyway. 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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Could Virginia apply for limited protection that is restricted 
to the tax revolt in the eastern counties? Or is Virginia allowed 
only to apply for protection generally that would allow the 
federal government to protect it against the western dispute, 
despite the wishes of the Virginia state legislature? There is a 
strong case that Virginia can apply for limited protection. The 
point of the Clause is to give the state the discretion whether or 
not to seek protection. If the state seeks protection for the 
eastern uprising, but not the western one, it furthers the 
underlying purpose to allow the application to apply only to the 
eastern one. It allows the state to weigh the dangers of federal 
intervention versus the state uprising, as to each uprising. 
Moreover, allowing the federal government to act against 
another uprising without state approval might give it the ability, 
once federal troops are in the state, to act against political 
opponents of the federal government. Finally, if the federal 
government can act without state approval once an application 
for protection has been made, then this may discourage a state 
from seeking protection, even though it needs the protection.61 
Based on this strong evidence from the ordinary meaning of 
“application” as well as from its use in the Guaranty Clause, I 
conclude that the state legislatures have the power to apply for 
limited conventions.62 
 
 61. It might be questioned whether my interpretation of the Guarantee Clause has 
implications for the meaning of Article V, because my interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause relies on the purposes underlying that Clause. Since the purposes underlying the 
Guarantee Clause might have been different (for reasons unrelated to the meaning of 
Article V), it might seem that my purpose-based interpretation of the Guarantee Clause 
does not provide independent support for the limited convention view of Article V.  
This argument, however, is mistaken. First. the Gaurantee Clause interpretation 
helps to confirm that my understanding of the ordinary meaning of “apply,” as revealed 
by the dictionary, is correct. If the Guarantee Clause had the alternative meaning, 
allowing applications only for protection generally, then one might question whether my 
reading of the dictionary meaning of “apply” was really correct. It would be odd for the 
Guarantee Clause to have used the word “apply” if the ordinary meaning of that term 
suggested a meaning contrary to the purposes of the Clause. Second, the Guarantee 
Clause supports the limited convention view of “apply” because there is a rule of 
construction that presumes words used in the same document have the same meaning. If 
“apply” in the Guarantee Clause had the alternative meaning, then that would have 
counted against the limited convention view of “apply.”  
 62. One last piece of evidence in favor of this understanding of application comes 
from an earlier version of Article V offered by James Madison at the Philadelphia 
Convention, which I discuss in the next section. The meaning of application in this 
version supports the view that states can choose for what type of convention they seek to 
apply.  
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 2. Congress’s Obligation to Call a Limited Convention 
Because the state legislatures may apply for a limited 
convention, this now leads us to the second issue—whether the 
Constitution requires Congress to follow the state legislatures’ 
applications and call a limited convention. Once again, the 
Constitution’s original meaning supports the limited convention 
view. 
First, the constitutional language allowing the states to 
apply for Congress to call a convention obligates Congress to call 
a convention. Putting the question of a limited convention to the 
side, assume that two thirds of the state legislatures call for an 
unlimited convention. It is widely accepted that Congress is 
obligated to call such a convention. As Gerald Gunther put it, 
this is one of the few issues upon which there is widespread 
agreement.63 The language of Article V strongly supports this 
result. It provides that “The Congress . . . on the Application of 
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states . . . shall call a 
convention.”64 The “shall” indicates that Congress is obligated to 
call the convention when the requisite number of applications 
have been submitted. Moreover, this textual analysis is 
supported by purposive considerations. One of the main 
purposes of the convention method is to establish an amendment 
process that does not require Congress’s approval. If Congress 
can refuse to call a convention, that allows Congress to block 
amendments. Finally, several statements made when the 
Constitution was enacted confirm that Congress was understood 
as being obliged to call a convention.65 
 
 63. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 5. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).  
 65. See A Friend of Society and Liberty, PA. GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 1788, reprinted in 18 
DOCUMENTARY HIST. 277, 283 (statement of Tench Coxe) (“It is provided in the clearest 
words, that Congress shall be obliged to call a convention on the application of two thirds 
of the legislatures . . . .”); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 12, at 177 (statement of James 
Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention) (arguing that when two thirds of the 
legislatures of the different states apply for a convention, “Congress are under the 
necessity of convening” a convention) (emphasis added); id. at 178 (statement of James 
Iredell at the North Carolina Ratifying convention) (arguing that the introduction of 
amendments “did not depend on the will of Congress; for that the legislatures of two 
thirds of the states were authorized to make application for calling a convention for 
proposing amendments, and on such application, it is provided that Congress shall call 
such convention, so that they will have no option”); A Pennsylvanian to the New York 
Convention, PA. GAZETTE, June 11, 1788, reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 1139, 
1142–43 (statement of Tench Coxe) (“If two thirds of those legislatures require it, 
Congress must call a general convention, even though they dislike the proposed 
amendments . . . .”).  
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But if Congress is obligated to call an unlimited convention 
when the states apply for one, and if the states are authorized to 
apply for a limited convention, this strongly suggests that 
Congress is obligated to call a limited convention when the states 
apply for one. After all, the same constitutional language that 
obligates Congress to call an unlimited convention would apply 
to the states’ applications for a limited convention.66 Moreover, if 
the Constitution authorizes both limited and unlimited con-
ventions, there is no reason to allow Congress to block 
applications for limited conventions, but not unlimited ones. 
C. THE OBLIGATION OF THE CONVENTION TO FOLLOW THE 
LIMITS SET BY THE STATES  AND CONGRESS 
This brings us to the final basic question. If Congress calls a 
limited convention, is the convention required to conform to the 
limitations in that call? Once again, the answer is yes. 
First, the convention derives its authority from Congress’s 
call and therefore is subject to the limitations in that call. 
Without that call, the convention—at least the one authorized by 
Article V—could not be lawfully brought into existence. If a 
convention were to try to form without a call, it would clearly be 
unconstitutional. It is the call that allows the convention to form. 
Thus, if the authority for the convention to form itself limits the 
power of the convention, the only convention that can form 
would be subject to those limits. The convention would have no 
more authority to go beyond those limits than a convention 
would have to form on its own without a call.67 
Second, that the Constitution recognizes limited con-
ventions suggests that a limited convention called by the 
 
 66. Another way to support the point in the text is to note that the Constitution 
does not allow Congress to call a limited convention when the states call for an unlimited 
one. But if that is true, then the Constitution should not allow Congress to call an 
unlimited convention when a limited convention is called.  
 67. The interpretations put forth in this article also gain support from the two main 
interpretive methods employed in the early years of the Constitution—the methods of 
the Democractic Republicans and the Federalists. Despite their significant differences, 
the interpretive methods of both of these groups support the positions that I defend in 
this Article. Thomas Jefferson, for the Democratic Republicans, argued that the 
Constitution was a compact between the states and should be interpreted in favor of the 
parties to the compact. In this case, this interpretive principle supports allowing the state 
legislatures to apply for a limited convention. Chief Justice John Marshall, for the 
Federalists, contended that words in the Constitution should be given their ordinary 
meaning and that no preference should be given to the states. Once again, this 
interpretive principle supports allowing the state legislatures to apply for a limited 
convention, because the ordinary language of the constitutional text favors this result. 
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Congress should be followed. It would be odd for the 
Constitution to authorize a limited convention and then allow 
the convention itself to ignore the limitations. For example, the 
Constitution says that each legislative house shall determine its 
rules of proceedings.68 No one would interpret that clause to 
mean that, while a house can determine those rules, those rules 
cannot be made binding on the individual members of the house. 
Similarly, one would not interpret Article V to authorize limited 
conventions, but then to allow the convention to ignore the call. 
Instead, if the Framers intended to allow the convention to 
ignore the limitations in the call, it is much more likely that they 
would not have authorized limited conventions, but instead 
authorized two thirds of the state legislatures merely to 
recommend measures to the convention.69 
IV. EVIDENCE FROM EARLY INTERPRETATIONS 
The textual arguments presented above derive additional 
support from interpretations made during the framing and 
ratification period. It is true that there are few situations where 
people made statements that have clear implications for whether 
the Constitution allows limited conventions. But these few 
situations that have been uncovered provide support for the 
limited convention view, and in one instance, the support is quite 
powerful. 
The most important evidence comes from the Philadelphia 
Convention’s discussion of the version of Article V that 
preceded the final version. This evidence, which is of word 
meaning rather than intent, strongly suggests that the words 
“propose” and “apply” had the meanings employed by the 
limited convention view. There is other evidence as well. Both a 
statement made during the ratification period by a prominent 
Federalist and an application for a convention provide some 
support for the limited convention view. 
While this Part discusses evidence in favor of the limited 
convention view, Part VI attempts to show that both the 
discussions and actions of the Philadelphia Convention, that 
others have argued support an unlimited convention, do not 
actually do so. 
 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 69. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the President “shall . . . recommend to [Congress] 
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient”).  
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A. INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIOR VERSION OF ARTICLE V 
Initially, the Convention considered the amendment provi-
sion contained in the Virginia Plan, which stated “that provision 
ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union 
whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the 
National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.”70 A 
modified version of this provision was submitted to the 
Committee on Detail, which reported a clause stating, “On the 
application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the 
Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of 
the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.”71 
This clause, however, was controversial, with objections being 
raised from a variety of perspectives. Elbridge Gerry criticized it 
on the ground that it appeared to permit a convention to amend 
the constitution without any further ratification procedure. 
Alexander Hamilton opposed it also because it allowed only the 
state legislatures, not the national legislature, to call for a 
convention.72 
At this point, James Madison proposed a replacement for 
the Committee on Detail’s provision. Initially, the replacement 
met with favor, being approved by a vote of nine states for, one 
against, and one divided. After being edited for stylistic 
purposes, Madison’s provision stated: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the 
Legislatures of the several States shall propose amendments 
to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been 
ratified by three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as 
the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by 
the Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be 
made prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the 1 & 
4 clauses in the 9. Section of article 1.73 
This provision closely resembles the final Article V language. It 
was largely the penultimate version of the article, and was 
changed mainly to employ a convention rather than Congress to 
draft amendments when the two thirds of the states had applied. 
 
 70. 1 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 22.  
 71. 2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 159. 
 72. Id. at 557–58. 
 73. Id. at 559.  
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Let us begin by exploring the meaning of this provision. The 
provision allows amendments to be proposed in two ways. First, 
it permits two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose 
amendments. Second, it permits Congress, presumably by 
majority vote, to propose an amendment upon application of 
two thirds of the state legislatures. 
It seems clear that this provision allows the state legislatures 
to apply for Congress to propose either an amendment relating 
to a subject or a specifically worded amendment. In both cases, 
the provision would require Congress to follow the terms of the 
applications. 
The strength of this interpretation derives from the fact that 
the provision requires a two thirds vote when Congress acts on 
its own, but allows Congress to use majority rule when it acts on 
the applications of the state legislatures. If Congress was not 
bound by the state legislatures’ instructions, it is hard to 
understand why Congress was required to secure two thirds 
when acting on its own, but only a majority when acting pursuant 
to state applications. Thus, when the state legislatures require 
that Congress propose an amendment concerning a specific 
subject, Congress would be obligated to pass an amendment and 
could use majority rule. Similarly, when the state legislatures 
required that Congress propose a specific amendment, Congress 
would also be obligated to pass that amendment and could use 
majority rule. The alternative interpretation of Madison’s 
proposal—that the state legislatures’ applications were not 
binding on the Congress—cannot account for the way that the 
provision uses majority and supermajority rules and is therefore 
extremely weak. 
This straightforward reading of the provision that I offer 
also appears to be James Madison’s interpretation of it, which 
can be seen by his response to a proposal to amend the 
provision. George Mason had argued that Madison’s proposal 
gave Congress too great a role in the amendment process. 
Mason stated, “As the proposing of amendments is in both the 
modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the second, 
ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind 
would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should 
become oppressive . . . .”74 As a result, Gouvernor Morris and 
Elbridge Gerry moved to amend the article “so as to require a 
 
 74. Id. at 629. 
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Convention on application of 2/3 of the States,” which eventually 
became the final version of Article V.75 Madison objected to the 
Morris/Gerry proposal on the ground that he “did not see why 
Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments 
applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a Convention on 
the like application.”76 
Madison’s response reveals his support for the above 
interpretation in two ways. First, the language of his response 
suggests that the state legislatures would be applying for 
amendments to be proposed. There is not the slightest suggestion 
that the state applications would merely allow Congress to 
decide on its own what amendments to propose. Second, that 
Madison thought his provision would bind Congress as much as 
the final Article V also suggests that the states would be 
proposing amendments in some form. If Congress were given 
discretion as to what amendments to propose, Madison would 
not have spoken of it as being bound to the same extent as 
Congress is to call a convention. 
Moreover, that Mason and the other delegates objected to 
Madison’s proposal does not suggest that they disagreed with 
Madison’s interpretation of it. Rather, they may have objected 
to Congress’s additional role under Madison’s version for other 
reasons. First, if the states sought an amendment on a subject, 
such as controlling federal debt, Madison’s proposal would give 
Congress more ability to block the amendment than the final 
Article V did, even though Congress was obligated under Article 
V to call the limited convention. While there may be some 
discretion involved in deciding whether to call a convention, 
there is considerably more discretion involved in drafting an 
amendment applied for by the states. Under Madison’s proposal, 
Congress could use its role to draft a bad provision or to pass 
nothing at all, claiming it could not agree on a specific proposal. 
Second, if the states could not agree on either a specifically 
worded amendment or a general idea for an amendment, the 
power to propose an amendment then would be possessed 
entirely by Congress. By contrast, under the final Article V, if 
the states could not agree on a specifically worded amendment 
or a general idea for an amendment, they could still apply for an 
unlimited convention. This would be far preferable from 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 629–30. 
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Mason’s perspective, because the convention would be 
independent of Congress. 
The meaning of Madison’s proposal helps to clarify the 
meaning of the actual Article V in several important respects. 
First, the meaning of Madison’s proposal confirms the analysis of 
propose that I offered in Section IIIA above. Under Madison’s 
proposal, when two thirds of the state legislatures applied to 
Congress for an amendment, Congress was required to propose 
that amendment, not just any amendment. But if “propose” 
meant unlimited discretion to recommend a measure, as the 
unlimited convention view holds, then Madison’s provision 
would not have this meaning. By contrast, if “propose” simply 
meant “to offer for adoption,” then the provision has exactly the 
meaning that Madison and others believed it had. When the 
state legislatures apply for an amendment, Congress is required 
to offer it for adoption by the ratifiers—to propose it. 
Second, the meaning of Madison’s provision is also 
revealing as to the language concerning state applications. Both 
Madison’s proposal and Article V contain virtually the same 
language as to applications—“on the application of two thirds” 
of the state legislatures. Under Madison’s proposal, this 
language clearly contemplates that the applications can apply for 
particular amendments (either in general terms or in specific 
language) and that Congress will be bound to follow these 
applications. That the actual Article V uses the same language 
strongly suggests that application has the same meaning and 
therefore adopts the limited convention view on this issue. 
Finally, if one does not merely focus on the individual words 
“propose” or “apply,” but instead looks at the phrases in the 
clauses, this perspective also supports the limited convention 
view. Commentators who favor the unlimited convention view 
interpret the language in the actual Article V, “The Congress . . . 
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments,” as not allowing the states to place limits on what the 
convention can propose. Part of the argument seems to be that 
there is nothing explicit allowing the states to limit the 
convention and no implicit authority is implied. But the very 
similar language in Madison’s proposal, “The Congress . . . on 
the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several 
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution,” clearly 
allows the states to place limits on what Congress can propose, 
even though there is nothing explicit allowing the states to do so. 
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It is hard to see the basis of the distinction between Article V 
and Madison’s proposal. 
Thus, the language in Madison’s proposal strongly suggests 
that the final version of Article V adopts the limited convention 
view as to the meaning of both state legislative applications and 
the convention’s proposing power. 
B. INTERPRETATIONS FROM THE RATIFICATION PERIOD 
It is not merely the actions of the Philadelphia Convention 
that support a limited convention. At least two pieces of 
evidence from the period immediately after the Constitution was 
written also support the limited convention view. 
First, Trench Coxe, who was assistant Secretary of State 
under Alexander Hamilton, wrote a letter to the New York 
Ratification Convention, urging ratification of the Constitution. 
In the letter, Coxe wrote77: 
If two thirds of those legislatures require it, Congress must 
call a general convention, even though they dislike the 
proposed amendments, and if three fourths of the state 
legislatures or conventions approve such proposed amend-
ments, they become an actual and binding part of the 
constitution, without any possible interference of Congress. 
This quote suggests that Coxe interpreted the Constitution to 
allow limited conventions.78 His claim that Congress must call a 
 
 77. A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention, PA. GAZETTE, June 11, 1788, 
reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HIST. 1139, 1142–43 (italics omitted).  
 78. Coxe here refers to a general convention. While some commentators appear to 
believe that the term refers to an unlimited convention, Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1634 
n.47, at the time of the Framing a general convention did not mean an unlimited 
convention. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at xx–xxi, 23.  
A general convention was a convention of all the states, in contrast to a partial 
convention, which was a convention of a subset of the states. See 6 MADISON’S PAPERS at 
425 (noting that Madison and Hamilton, referring to a convention to be held among the 
New England states, “disapproved of these partial conventions.” Rather, Madison 
“wished instead of them to see a general Convention take place.”) When the Framers’ 
generation sought to describe an unlimited convention, they used the terms plenary or 
plenipotentiary. See James Madison to James Monroe, March 19, 1786, in 8 MADISON’S 
PAPERS at 505 (contrasting the limited Annapolis Convention with a hypothetical 
unlimited convention which would have involved “a plenipotentiary commission to their 
deputies for the convention”); Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, Sept. 3, 1780, in 2 
HAMILTON PAPERS at 407–08 (recommending the “calling immediately [of] a convention 
of all the states . . . vested with plenipotentiary authority” to bring about “a solid coercive 
union.”).  
This understanding of general and plenipotentiary is also supported by the meanings 
of these terms when not used in relation to conventions. For example, Webster’s 
dictionary defines general as “common to many or the greatest number; as a general 
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convention, even though it dislikes the proposed amendments, 
suggests that the applications are seeking a convention limited to 
proposing certain amendments. Of course, the quote is not 
entirely free of ambiguity. It is possible that Coxe is referring to 
a situation where the applications were not seeking a convention 
limited to a specific amendment, but it was known that the state 
legislators intended the convention to propose those 
amendments. Still, the wording of the quote suggests that the 
applications were seeking a convention limited to proposing 
specific amendments and therefore the quote supports the 
limited convention view. 
Second, one of the first two applications for a convention 
under the new Constitution also supports the limited convention 
view. After the Constitution was put into effect, two states made 
applications for a convention. The movement for a second 
convention stalled, however, after James Madison led the 
Congress to propose a bill of rights. While New York’s 
applications sought a plenary or unlimited convention, Virginia’s 
application may have sought a limited convention. The 
application asked that “a convention be immediately called . . . 
with full power to take into their consideration the defects of the 
Constitution that have been suggested by the State Conventions, 
and report such amendments thereto as they shall find best 
suited to promote our common interests, and secure to ourselves 
and our latest posterity the great and unalienable rights of 
mankind.”79 It is possible that this application sought a 
convention limited to proposing amendments on problems 
identified by the ratification debates. This would prevent 
federalists from controlling the convention and proposing 
provisions that would make the Constitution even more 
nationalist. Of course, the language here is pretty vague and 
seems to allow the convention wide discretion. But even if it is 
not read as establishing a limited convention, the phrasing of the 
application still supports a limited convention. It asks for a 
convention “with full power to take into their consideration” the 
 
opinion; a general custom.” Similarly, the Constitution’s preamble states as a purpose to 
“promote the general welfare.” Further, in Federalist No. 43, James Madison states the 
Constitution “equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the 
amendment of errors.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 296 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). Clearly, the reference to the federal government as the general 
government suggests that it is the common government of all the people (in contrast to 
particular state governments). It would not indicate a government of unlimited powers, 
since the Federalist strongly argued the general government had limited powers.  
 79. 1 House Journal, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1789).  
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defects in the Constitution suggested by the state conventions. 
That the application asked for a convention with “full power” 
suggests that it believed that conventions with less power were 
possible. Thus, whether or not this is read as seeking a limited 
convention, it provides some support for the limited convention 
view. 
V. THE LIMITED CONVENTION VIEW: PURPOSE AND 
STRUCTURE 
These largely textual arguments in favor of the limited 
convention view are also supported by two arguments based on 
purpose and structure. These three arguments suggest that the 
constitutional enactors would have had strong reasons to allow 
limited conventions. First, if limited conventions were not 
recognized by the Constitution, then the constitutional enactors’ 
decision to have the states determine whether to hold a 
convention would seem peculiar. Why would the Constitution 
allow the states to decide on whether to have a convention, but 
not allow them to specify what subjects the convention should 
discuss? Put differently, why would the constitutional enactors 
allow the states to decide not to hold any convention—and 
thereby to determine that none of the current problems warrant 
a convention—but not allow them the lesser power of 
determining that only certain problems warrant a convention? 
A second purpose and structure argument for the limited 
convention view is that allowing the state legislatures to apply 
for a limited convention permits a more effective amendment 
procedure. While the state legislatures may desire an unlimited 
convention to make broad constitutional changes, they might 
instead seek a limited convention to address smaller problems. 
The state legislatures might believe that a narrower 
constitutional change is all that is needed and fear the 
uncertainty of an unlimited convention.80 By denying the state 
legislatures the ability to apply for limited conventions, the 
unlimited convention view imposes an uncertainty tax on the 
convention method and makes it less likely that state legislatures 
will apply for a convention. This is especially problematic since 
the Constitution views the congressional proposal method and 
the convention method as alternative procedures useful to 
 
 80. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 990 (arguing that a convention is most likely 
to be called in response to some “particular usurpations” by Congress and that a limited 
convention would be the appropriate way to address a specific concern). 
!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012  3:19 PM 
90 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 81:53 
 
preventing any one entity from blocking amendments. Thus, the 
limited convention view will further the constitutional purpose 
of permitting the convention method to be an effective 
alternative to the congressional proposal method.81 
 Third, the limited convention view employs a more 
effective mechanism for adopting amendments when there is 
reason to believe that the Constitution has a defect that requires 
a specific remedy. When two thirds of the state legislatures have 
concluded that a specific subject or amendment needs to be 
considered, there are significant advantages to limiting the 
convention to addressing that subject rather than allowing it to 
propose amendments on any subject. To begin with, limiting the 
convention to a specific area allows for delegates to be selected 
who have expertise in that area. Limiting the convention to a 
specific area should also operate to make the convention’s 
review of the issue simpler and smoother. A limited convention 
is likely to reach a quicker resolution, since it only needs to 
discuss one issue. Moreover, an unlimited convention could 
easily take actions that would result in the specific amendment 
not being enacted, even though it would have enacted under a 
limited convention. For example, the convention might choose 
to propose one or more amendments on other subjects and then 
conclude that it should not propose the specific amendment, 
because that would amount to too significant a change in the 
Constitution. Alternatively, the convention might end up 
deadlocking on other amendments, with the resulting discord 
leading the delegates to dissolve the convention rather than 
considering the specific amendment. 
These three arguments suggest that the constitutional 
enactors would have had substantial reasons to adopt the limited 
convention view. Are there reasons for them to have adopted 
the unlimited convention view? The strongest argument on the 
other side is the view that the constitutional enactors would not 
have wanted the states to have too significant a role in the 
constitutional amendment process. Therefore, they would have 
allowed the state legislatures to call an unlimited convention—
which the states would be unlikely to do often and would have 
no formal control over—but not a limited convention, which 
 
 81. Moreover, this constitutional purpose is not merely hypothetical. Because of the 
fear of a runaway convention, the convention method has proven to be an ineffective, 
broken amendment method. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.  
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would allow them too much ability to influence the amendment 
proposing process. 
The problem with this view is that it requires a hostility 
towards the states that was not held generally when the 
Constitution was enacted. Instead, the Constitution was based 
on the view that both the national government and the state 
governments had virtues and vices and the constitutional 
structure should be designed accordingly. In the Article V area, 
this view suggests that both Congress and the state legislatures 
should be able to propose (and ultimately enact) amendments 
without the other entity being able to veto the amendment.82 
Thus, the desire to prevent the state legislatures from having an 
effective mechanism to amend the Constitution is inconsistent 
with the overall design of the Constitution and the purposes 
underlying it. 
VI. WEAKNESSES OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE 
UNLIMITED CONVENTION VIEW 
These arguments for the limited convention view are 
powerful. They both show that the limited convention view 
derives from the ordinary meaning of the constitutional language 
and give strong reasons why the constitutional enactors would 
have wanted the constitution to allow limited conventions. But 
there are three other arguments that have been made against 
limited conventions that should be addressed. It turns out, 
however, that these arguments are ineffective. Thus, the case for 
the limited convention view also draws strength from the 
weakness of the arguments made against that view. 
A. A CONVENTION IS NOT AN UNLIMITED ASSEMBLY  
OF THE PEOPLE 
Some commentators have argued that the convention 
cannot be limited because it is an illimitable assembly of the 
people.83 The idea here seems to be that a convention is a special 
body that represents and exercises the sovereign power of the 
people. Since the people are the ultimate sovereigns, no limits 
can be placed on them or the convention. But this argument is 
mistaken on both textual and historical grounds. 
 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.  
 83. See e.g., Paulsen, supra note 2, at 738.  
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 1. Text 
Textually, it seems clear that the national proposing 
convention (as well as the Constitution’s ratification 
conventions) should not be viewed as exercising the full 
sovereignty of the people and therefore as illimitable. There are 
several strong reasons that support this conclusion. First, if the 
national proposing convention sought to deprive the states, 
without their consent, of their equal suffrage in the Senate, the 
convention would be violating a clear textual command and 
would be acting illegally. Similarly, if the convention’s proposed 
amendment stated that it would be subject to ratification by two 
thirds of the states (as opposed to the three quarters that the 
Constitution requires), this action would also be clearly illegal. 
Thus, it is mistaken to claim that the Constitution cannot limit 
the convention. 
A second reason why the national proposing convention is 
not illimitable is that it is a mere proposing convention. A 
convention for proposing amendments does not have the power 
to enact anything. It merely proposes an amendment that must 
then be ratified by states. Similarly, the ratification conventions 
in the Constitution are also limited. They do not have the power 
to propose amendments. Nor do they have the power to take 
other actions, such as legislating. 
Finally, that the Constitution does not view the conventions 
as illimitable assertions of the sovereignty of the people is 
confirmed by the fact that the conventions’ roles can also be 
served by legislatures, which are clearly not exercising sovereign 
authority. While the national proposing convention has the 
power to propose an amendment, so does the Congress. 
Similarly, while state conventions can be used to ratify an 
amendment, so can state legislatures. Thus, the conventions are 
unlikely to be exercising sovereign authority if the non-sovereign 
legislatures can be given the same authority that the conventions 
exercise. Instead, the conventions are better seen as limited 
institutions, employed as alternatives to the legislature, to 
improve the amendment process. 
Thus, textually, the Constitution makes it absolutely clear 
that neither the national proposing convention nor the state 
ratification conventions are immune from being limited. The 
Constitution places limits on the provisions that they can 
propose or ratify; it limits their roles to proposing or ratifying, 
but not both; and it employs non-sovereign legislatures to 
perform these same rules. Given that the Constitution does not 
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treat the conventions as illimitable assertions of sovereign 
power, there is no reason to infer that the Constitution does not 
authorize the state legislatures to apply for limited conventions. 
The Constitution employs conventions as part of a multi-stage 
process designed to produce desirable amendments. Allowing 
state legislatures to apply for limits on the national proposing 
convention is easily seen as a means to that end. 
 2. History 
If the fact that a convention can be limited is so textually 
evident, why does this idea of the convention as an illimitable 
assembly of the people seem plausible to some commentators? 
The short answer is that at the time of the Constitution’s 
enactment, conventions had various meanings and had different 
powers depending on the context. Some conventions exercised 
quite significant powers, resembling those of a sovereign. But 
the fact that some conventions had these characteristics does not 
mean that all or most did. Other conventions exercised much 
more limited authority. Thus, it is entirely proper to follow the 
textual and structural cues in the Constitution that suggest the 
proposing and ratifying conventions were limited, even though 
some conventions at the time of the Constitution had much 
broader power. 
To understand the meaning of “convention” at the time of 
the Constitution, it is useful to briefly review the history of 
conventions. The term “convention” came to prominence in 17th 
century England. After the revolutions in 1660 and 1689, there 
was no King in existence to call the Parliament and therefore 
these Parliaments met on their own authority.84 These bodies 
were known as Convention Parliaments. In both cases, the 
Convention Parliaments legislated fundamental arrangements 
that were deemed to be part of the English Constitution.85 Thus, 
a convention was thought of as a means of enacting a con-
stitution or establishing a government when existing laws did not 
provide a mechanism for doing so.86 
It was thus natural that the new states would use 
conventions when they established their new constitutions and 
governments after declaring independence from the King. Yet, 
 
 84. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8; see also GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 311 (1969). 
 85. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8. 
 86. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 7–8; JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 8. 
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the understanding of conventions at the time was still quite 
undeveloped. Although some states used conventions to write 
their constitutions, others used legislatures to do so.87 Moreover, 
some of these conventions also exercised ordinary legislative 
powers.88 Thus, conventions were not yet clearly understood to 
be entities that had only the power of drafting or enacting a 
constitution. 
The first conventions that only exercised constitutional 
enactment powers were those of New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts.89 In Massachusetts, the legislature had made 
several unsuccessful attempts to write a constitution that were 
rejected on the ground that the drafting should occur by an 
entity limited solely to that task. Finally, in 1779, the legislature 
accepted the principle and scheduled elections for a 
constitutional convention that wrote a constitution, which was 
then approved by the towns.90 Similarly, the New Hampshire 
constitution was written by a convention solely limited to that 
task, and then sent to the people for ratification.91 Thus, it took 
several years before two states clearly adopted an approach 
where constitutions were adopted by conventions that were 
employed solely for that purpose. 
The convention method of enacting constitutional 
provisions was also developed in other ways. Once a constitution 
was enacted, the constitution could also authorize its own 
amendment. This was a very significant development, because it 
meant that it was no longer necessary to take extra-legal or 
revolutionary actions when one sought to change the 
constitution. Given the role of conventions in the writing of 
constitutions, it was natural for the new constitutions to use 
conventions as part of their amendment procedures as well. 
In an effort to devise desirable amendment procedures, 
these constitution used conventions in a variety of ways. Some 
constitutions gave conventions relatively limited powers. As 
discussed earlier, the 1777 Georgia Constitution, employed a 
 
 87. ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, 
POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 2–4 (1917); See e.g., JAMESON, supra note 31, at § 135. 
 88. See HOAR, supra note 87, at 4; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 136–37 (South 
Carolina), 139–40 (New Jersey); 193 (Pennsylvania); 145 (Maryland); 146 (North 
Carolina); 147–49 (Georgia); 150 (New York) (discussing the general legislative powers 
of individual state conventions). 
 89. HOAR, supra note 87, at 4–5; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 118–120. 
 90. CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 13; HOAR, supra note 87, at 5–6; JAMESON, supra note 
31, at §§ 142–143. 
 91. HOAR, supra note 87, at 6; JAMESON, supra note 31, at §§ 120–121. 
!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012  3:19 PM 
2012] LIMITED CONVENTION 95 
 
constitutional convention to enact constitutional amendments, 
but did so only if the convention was called by petitions from the 
people and only if the convention enacted provisions that had 
been sought by those petitions.92 In two other state constitutions, 
the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution and the 1784 Vermont 
Constitution, conventions were employed solely to ratify 
measures proposed by a council of censors.93 Further, the 1784 
New Hampshire Constitution provided for the legislature, in 
seven year’s time, to have the towns elect delegates to a 
convention to propose constitutional amendments, which would 
only take effect if approved by two thirds of the voters collected 
in the towns.94 
Other constitutions authorized more powerful conventions. 
The following three conventions, once called, appeared to have 
the authority to enact constitutional provisions without further 
ratification. The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution provided that 
two thirds of the voters could authorize a constitutional 
convention in 1795.95 The 1790 South Carolina Constitution 
allowed a “convention of the people” to be called upon the vote 
of two thirds of both branches of the legislature.96 Finally, the 
Delaware Constitution of 1792 allowed a majority of the people 
eligible to vote to authorize the calling of a convention.97 
Finally, some of these constitutions were amended or 
replaced through conventions, even though the constitution did 
not expressly provide for such actions. For example, the 
Massachusetts Constitution was amended in 1820 by a 
convention called by the legislature, even though this 
amendment procedure was not specifically provided for in the 
constitution.98 Similarly, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 was 
replaced in 1792 after the legislature called a convention that the 
constitution did not specifically authorize.99 The actions of these 
types of conventions, which were usually called by the 
legislature, can be conceptualized in one of three ways. First, 
they might categorized as revolutionary actions that violated the 
previous constitution and therefore were illegal. Second, they 
 
 92. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII. 
 93. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47; VT. CONST. of 1786, § XL. 
 94. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2. art. 100. 
 95. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch.VI, art. X. 
 96. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. XI. 
 97. DEL. CONST. of 1792 art X.. 
 98. Jameson, supra note 31, at § 219. 
 99. Id. at § 223. 
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might be viewed as actions that were neither authorized nor 
prohibited by the previous constitution. In this unusual category, 
the constitution would not authorize the convention, but it 
would not prohibit it, thereby allowing a convention that 
represents the people to act on its own authority to frame a new 
constitution. Finally, the actions of the conventions might be 
viewed as having been implicitly authorized by the previous 
constitution. While the constitution did not contain a specific 
provision that authorized the convention, the constitution’s 
structure and principles were viewed as authorizing the action. 
None of these categories, however, provide support for the 
unlimited convention view. The unlimited convention view 
argues that the Constitution authorizes unlimited conventions. 
But under the first two categories—revolutionary and 
unauthorized conventions—the state conventions were not 
authorized by the existing constitution. Thus, these unauthorized 
state conventions were not precedents for the type of authorized 
convention that the unlimited convention asserts the 
Constitution established. If these two type of state conventions 
were to inform the meaning of the proposing convention, then 
that convention would not derive its power from the 
Constitution. It would have extraconstitutional powers. That is 
simply not the argument made by the unlimited convention view. 
Nor does the third category of implicitly authorized 
conventions provide support for the unlimited convention view. 
Such implicitly authorized conventions do not comport well with 
the structure of the Constitution and therefore it is unlikely that 
the Constitution could be interpreted to implicitly authorize such 
conventions.100 Moreover, even if these conventions were 
 
 100. The United States Constitution is not easily interpreted as implicitly authorizing 
a convention. To be implicitly authorized, such a convention would have to be derived 
from constitutional structure and general principles rather than from a specific provision. 
This claim will make most sense in a constitution which has a strong textual commitment 
to popular sovereignty, vests general legislative powers in the legislature (so that it can 
call the convention), and does not have ample amendment procedures which appear to 
“occupy the field” of amendment matters. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 pt. 2, ch. VI, 
art. X. While the U.S. Constitution does endorse popular sovereignty, it confers only 
enumerated powers on the Congress and also has ample amendment procedures. For an 
argument in favor of the implicit authorized view (that also allows contrary to text 
amendments, such as those depriving states of their equal voting rights in the Senate), see 
generally Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar 1988]; Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar 1994]; for a critique, see generally Henry Paul 
Monaghan, We the People(s), Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996). 
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implicitly authorized, they would not support the unlimited 
convention view, since (as discussed in the preceding paragraph) 
that view makes claims about the explicitly authorized 
conventions in Article V, not implicitly authorized ones.101 
We can now turn to the implications of this history for the 
United States Constitution. First, the history helps to explain 
why some commentators might regard the proposing convention 
as an illimitable assertion of the sovereignty of the people, even 
though the constitutional text so clearly places limits on the 
convention. At the time of the Constitution, some conventions 
were seen as specially representing the sovereignty of the 
people. These conventions had significant power to enact 
constitutions. But over time, the concept of a convention 
developed. Conventions also came to be used in more limited 
ways as part of constitutionally established multi-step processes 
for constitutional change. These constitutional processes could 
be used not merely for enacting a new constitution, but also for 
amending the constitution. Moreover, these constitutional 
processes placed limits on the powers of conventions. Thus, the 
commentators who have interpreted the proposing convention 
as an illimitable convention are making a mistake that is easy to 
identify. Their mistake is to interpret an ambiguous term to have 
one meaning when the context makes clear that it has a different 
meaning. 
This analysis also confirms the analysis of the constitutional 
language that I presented earlier. The Constitution speaks of a 
“Convention for proposing Amendments.” Why did the enactors 
 
My own view is that the only area where an implicitly authorized convention might 
be plausible is a convention that would replace the existing constitution with a new 
constitution. Although there are still strong arguments against it, Article V might be read 
as “occupying the field” of amendments but not the field of establishing a new 
constitution. To my mind, an even stronger interpretation is to view such a convention as 
neither prohibited nor authorized (the second category) rather than as implicitly 
authorized. Whether or not conventions that seek to establish a new constitution are 
viewed as in the second or third category, however, they do not support the limited 
convention view, which views the convention as expressly authorized. See supra Part III.  
 101. The reason these implicitly authorized conventions do not support the 
unlimited convention view is that these conventions are not Article V conventions. An 
implicitly authorized convention is one that is implicitly authorized as opposed to the 
proposing convention in Article V, which is explicitly authorized. The unlimited 
convention view makes a claim about the power of the Article V convention, not about 
the power of other conventions. Thus, even if the Constitution does implicitly authorize 
conventions (and those conventions are unlimited), it does not mean the Article V 
conventions are unlimited. The Article V convention could be a limited one, while the 
implicitly authorized one could be unlimited.  
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use this language? This history makes clear that they needed to 
indicate that the convention could only propose amendments; it 
could not enact them on their own authority or exercise other 
powers, such as passing ordinary laws. The language a 
“Convention for proposing Amendments” does exactly that. 
There is no need to search for additional functions of the 
language to make sense of its inclusion in the Constitution. 
Moreover, the language becomes even clearer when it is 
contrasted with the other type of convention in the 
Constitution—the ratification convention. The proposing 
convention can only propose amendments; the ratification 
convention can only ratify them. Neither type of convention has 
the authority on its own to enact constitutional provisions. 
B. THE RUNAWAY PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION 
Another argument sometimes made against the limited 
convention view is that the Philadelphia Convention ignored the 
limits placed on it by both Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation and the state legislatures and therefore was a 
runaway convention. Thus, one might conclude that the 
Philadelphia Convention likewise believed that Congress’s 
power under the Constitution should not be binding on the 
national convention. Consequently, it would be constitutional 
for the convention to ignore the limits on Congress’s call. 
The experience of the Philadelphia Convention, however, 
cannot be applied so quickly to the United States Constitution. 
Instead, the Convention’s actions are best explained as based 
either on the view that the Articles were no longer legally 
binding due to prior infractions or on the belief that 
revolutionary and therefore illegal action was justified as 
necessary to save the nation. Neither the Convention delegates 
nor its defenders argued that limits placed in a call were not 
legally binding. Instead, they sought to camouflage or minimize 
the extent of their violation of the limits.102 
 
 102. My argument here assumes that the Philadelphia Convention was a runaway 
convention. Robert Natelson contends, however, that the Philadelphia Convention was 
not such a convention. Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by 
Convention: Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). If he is 
correct, then, this supports my interpretation even more strongly. Unfortunately, I am 
not at all certain that Natelson is correct. Natelson states that there were two types of 
limits placed on the convention: limits imposed by the state legislatures on their 
delegations to the convention and limits established by the Congress, under the Articles 
of Confederation, in their call for the convention. Natelson acknowledges that the 
Convention exceeded the limits imposed by Congress, but argues that Congress’s 
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One way that the Philadelphia Convention might have 
understood its actions is as proposing a new constitution, not 
because conventions had inherent authority to do so, but 
because the Articles of Confederation had been seriously and 
repeatedly violated and therefore was no longer deemed 
binding. James Madison made the argument that state violations 
had rendered the Articles, as a treaty, voidable, and Akhil Amar 
has argued that the new Constitution therefore could have 
legally superseded the Articles.103 If this was the Convention’s 
view of the matter, its actions would not say anything about the 
power of a proposing convention under the United States 
Constitution. 
The Philadelphia Convention might also have understood 
its actions as being illegal under existing law, but as justified on 
policy grounds by the pressing problems that the states and the 
nation faced under the Articles. In other words, the Convention 
was understood as proposing a revolutionary action, but one that 
was necessary to provide the nation with a desirable political 
order. Madison argues along these lines in Federalist No. 40 
where he appears to acknowledge that the Convention’s 
proposal departed from Articles’ unanimity requirement for 
amendments that was specifically mentioned in the call for the 
Convention. Madison justified the departure as necessary, 
because the smallest state, Rhode Island, would have refused to 
ratify anything the Convention proposed. He claims that it was 
 
limitations were not contained in a “legal call,” since “Congress had no power to issue 
such a call.” Id. at 720. By contrast, Natelson interprets the state legislative authoriza-
tions broadly and thereby concludes that the Convention conformed to the instructions 
in 10 of the 12 states. Thus, Natelson concludes that the Convention did not exceed the 
only limits that were binding.  
Even assuming both that Natelson’s interpretation of the state directions is correct 
and that following 10 of the 12 states is sufficient, there is a strong argument that the 
Congress did have authority over the Philadelphia Convention. Based on the evidence, 
one can view the Philadelphia Convention as an advisory or drafting committee 
established by the Congress to recommend amendments to it. The Articles provided that 
amendments were first to “be agreed to in” Congress “and be afterwards confirmed by 
the legislatures of every State.” The Congress then called for the Philadelphia 
Convention with the instruction that the Convention “report . . . to Congress” its 
proposed revisions to the Articles. These actions are entirely consistent with the view 
that Congress was using the Philadelphia Convention as an advisory committee. If this 
was the Convention’s role, then the Congress would have had authority over the 
“committee” and therefore the Convention’s failure to follow Congress’s directions 
might very well make it a runaway convention.  
 103. See Amar 1988, supra note 100, at 1048; Amar 1994, supra note 100, at 465; THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 316 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
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the Convention’s duty to make this departure, because the 
welfare of the nation was in jeopardy.104 
These two explanations for the Convention’s actions, for 
which there is significant support, do not suggest that the 
Convention believed it was not legally bound by the limits in the 
call. Is there any evidence for the opposite conclusion? The best 
evidence would be statements, made both at the Convention and 
in defense of its work, that a proposing convention cannot be 
limited and therefore that it actions were proper. The defenders 
of the unlimited convention view, however, have not offered 
such evidence. 
Instead, the defenses of the Convention’s actions are 
framed differently. James Madison, for example, attempted to 
deny or minimize that the convention was departing from the 
call.105 It is only when it becomes clear that the Convention has 
departed, by changing the ratification method from unanimity of 
state legislatures to nine-thirteenths of conventions, that 
Madison grudgingly admits it. This is not how someone would 
argue who believed they were not bound by the call.106 
C. THE SUPPOSED INTENT TO AVOID RELIANCE ON BOTH 
CONGRESS AND THE STATE LEGISLATURES 
Walter Dellinger has also argued against a limited 
convention based on his interpretation of the intent of the 
Framers revealed in the Philadelphia Convention debates. 
Reviewing the statements made at the convention as well as the 
evolution of the amendment provisions, Dellinger discerns two 
“themes” of the debates concerning the amendment provisions: 
that “state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify 
amendments that enhance their power”107 and that “Congress 
should not have exclusive power to propose amendments.”108 
 
 104. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 290 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961) (“The forebearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of 
the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a 
thirteenth . . . .”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. It might also be argued that the Philadelphia Convention believed that there 
could not be a limited convention at all (as opposed to the claim discussed in the text that 
it believed that the limits were not binding). But the same evidence that disproves the 
claim discussed in the text also refutes this claim.  
 107. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1630. Dellinger’s description of the first theme 
here—that “state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify amendments that 
enhance their power”—is problematic for a variety of reasons. To begin with, even under 
a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment, state legislatures do not 
propose amendments. As discussed below, the convention must decide to propose the 
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From these two themes, Dellinger then concludes that the 
Framers would not have desired the limited convention view. 
First, he argues that conventions limited to a specifically worded 
amendment would allow the states more power than the 
Framers would have desired. If two thirds of the states applied 
for a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment (or 
to a very narrowly defined subject), that would give the states 
too much authority in the proposal process, since they could 
both propose and ratify the amendment. 
Second, he argues that a convention limited to a specific 
subject would allow Congress more power over the convention 
than the Framers would have desired. If two thirds of the states 
applied for a convention on a subject, the limited convention 
view would require that Congress “define and enforce” the 
limits on the convention, which would give Congress too much 
power over the amendment method.109 In particular, Dellinger 
believes that Congress would have to determine whether 
applications that differed slightly or significantly from one 
another should be counted as applying for the same convention. 
It is important to emphasize that the methodology of 
Dellinger’s paper—like that of many of the other articles about 
Article V from the same period—has fallen out of fashion, 
especially among originalists. Rather than seeking the original 
meaning of the constitutional language, Dellinger seeks to 
discern the drafters’ intent from statements made, and the 
evolution of provisions, at the Philadelphia Convention. This 
approach has been subject to a variety of criticisms, including 
that it asks what the drafters who merely proposed the 
Constitution intended rather than what the Constitution meant 
to the country and the ratifiers who adopted it. But even 
assuming that one were to engage in this type of inquiry, 
Dellinger’s argument suffers from serious infirmities. In 
particular, the intent that Dellinger claims to divine from the 
 
amendment. In addition, even if the state legislatures did have power to propose an 
amendment, they would not necessarily have (or even be likely to have) control over the 
ratification. After all, if the state legislatures apply for an amendment that enhances their 
own power, and the convention approves it, Congress would then be likely to allocate the 
ratification decision to state conventions rather than to state legislatures, in the hope that 
the conventions might refuse to ratify it. Given the problems with Dellinger’s description 
of the first theme, I will interpret him as making the more plausible claim that the 
Framers would not have desired the states to have excessive power over the proposal and 
ratification process. This will allow his argument to be considered in its strongest light.  
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 1631. 
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Philadelphia Convention is unclear and supports the limited 
convention view at least as much as the unlimited one. 
 1. The States’ Alleged Excessive Power 
Let’s start with Dellinger’s claim that a convention limited 
to a specifically worded amendment would allow the states more 
power than the Framers would have desired. There are two basic 
problems with Dellinger’s claim here: his inference that the 
Framers did not want the states to have significant influence 
over the proposing power and his argument that the Framers 
would not have desired conventions limited to a specifically 
worded amendment. 
Starting with the first problem, Dellinger’s inference that 
the convention would not have wanted the states to have a 
significant role over the proposing power is problematic.110 The 
strongest evidence that he has here is from one delegate—
Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton objected to a proposal that 
provided, “On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds 
of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this 
Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a 
Convention for that purpose.” Hamilton argued: 
The mode proposed was not adequate. The State Legislatures 
will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase their 
own powers— The National Legislature will be the first to 
perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of 
amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two 
thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention.111 
Thus, Hamilton opposed the provision because it gave the state 
legislatures power to apply for alterations with a view to 
increasing their powers. Dellinger infers from this that Hamilton 
opposed allowing states too much power in the amendment 
process and eventually uses this purpose to conclude that the 
Framers would have opposed a convention limited to a 
specifically worded amendment. 
But Dellinger’s argument here is doubtful. The best 
understanding of Hamilton’s view is not that he was opposed to 
states having a significant role in the amendment process. 
Instead, it is that he was opposed to an amendment process that 
did not allow Congress to initiate amendments without the prior 
 
 110. See id. at 1633. 
 111. 2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 558. 
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consent of the states. He did not oppose the states being able to 
propose amendments; he merely believed that Congress should 
also be able to propose amendments. Several pieces of evidence 
support this interpretation. First, the provision Hamilton was 
criticizing would have given the state legislatures the exclusive 
power to initiate amendments—a convention could not be called 
unless the state legislatures applied for one. Hamilton’s words 
directly address this point. Because the state legislatures are 
focused on “increas[ing] their own powers,” they ought not to 
have the sole power to propose amendments. Instead, Congress 
“ought also to be empowered” to call a convention.112 
Second, this interpretation of Hamilton’s position gains 
support from the fact that once the amendment provision was 
altered to permit Congress as well as the state legislatures to 
propose amendments, neither Hamilton nor other nationalists 
voiced this objection to the amendment provision. In fact, 
Hamilton was even willing to support a provision that clearly 
gave the states the power to propose amendments without the 
consent of the Congress or a national convention. Madison’s 
proposal discussed above, which Dellinger admits is most 
plausibly interpreted to require Congress to submit the 
amendments applied for by the state legislatures, was seconded 
by Hamilton.113 This strongly suggests that Hamilton was not 
opposed to having state legislatures decide on specific proposals, 
so long as the Congress also had an independent means of 
proposing amendments. 
How, then, can Dellinger interpret Hamilton’s words to 
suggest that the states should not have the power to apply for 
specific amendments? One possibility is that Dellinger has 
misinterpreted the chronology of the convention. In describing 
the convention’s consideration of these matters, he writes that 
the convention had agreed on “a concurrent power to Congress 
and the state legislatures to initiate the amendment process” and 
had “easily agreed on the method by which Congress would 
propose amendments.”114 He then writes that the debate then 
focused on the alternative amendment method for the states. 
While “Mason of Virginia objected to congressional control over 
the proposal” of amendments, “set against his concerns was the 
threat, perceived by Hamilton, that the states would seek to 
 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
 113. 2 RECORDS, supra note 52, at 559. 
 114. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1625. 
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enhance their power at the expense of the federal government.” 
He concludes that “the drafters’ answer to this dilemma was to 
provide that a national convention to propose amendments be 
summoned at the request of two-thirds of the state 
legislatures.”115 
But this description of the convention proceedings is 
misleading. As I have shown, Hamilton’s objections were not 
made to a method under which Congress could propose 
amendments on its own. Rather, he objected to a method that 
gave the state legislatures the sole power to initiate the 
amendment process. Thus, one cannot infer that Hamilton 
opposed significant state involvement in the proposal process.116 
We can now turn to the second problem with Dellinger’s 
claim: Dellinger has weak arguments for why the Philadelphia 
Convention would have opposed a convention limited to a 
specifically worded amendment. He maintains that a convention 
limited to voting on whether or not to propose a specific 
amendment would have had little purpose, merely serving the 
function of “delaying the amendment process” and thereby 
providing additional time for reflection and debate.117 But it is 
not clear why Dellinger reads the convention’s function so 
 
 115. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1625–26. 
 116. Dellinger also relies on Roger Sherman’s objection to Madison’s proposal 
(discussed above) of an amendment provision, which would have allowed the states to 
apply for Congress to pass an amendment. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1627–28. 
Sherman objected to the proposal on the ground that “three-quarters of the States might 
be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or 
depriving them of their equality in the Senate.” Dellinger claims that the change to the 
final Article V “might be seen as responsive to Sherman’s concern, for it provided that a 
national convention, rather than the states, would formulate proposed amendments.” Id.  
Dellinger’s argument here, however, is quite a reach. First, if Sherman was 
concerned about protecting the states, then relying on a national institution (the 
convention), rather than the states, seems like a counterintuitive strategy. Moreover, 
employing a national convention that could act based on a majority vote would be less 
protective of “particular States” than relying on a two thirds vote of the states generally. 
(Although Dellinger does not make the argument, it might be thought that requiring two 
thirds of the state legislatures would be redundant, since three quarters of the states are 
required for ratification. But the Congress can choose ratification by state conventions 
and therefore having two thirds of the state legislatures approve the amendment would 
be an additional check.) 
Finally, rather than Sherman’s concerns leading to the adoption of a national 
convention method, it seems that they led to other changes in Madison’s proposal. Once 
Madison’s proposal was replaced with a national proposing convention, Sherman sought 
to amend it by adding a provision stating “that no State shall without its consent be 
affected in its internal police, or deprived ot its equal suffrage in the Senate.” 2 
RECORDS, supra note 52, at 630. The first part of the provision relating to internal police 
did not pass, but the second part was added to Article V.  
 117. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1632. 
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narrowly. The convention does not merely have the power to 
delay the amendment. The convention has the power to refuse 
to propose the amendment applied for by the states. This is a 
veto. Few people regard the President’s veto over legislation as 
inconsequential; it is not clear why this veto is any different.118 
The convention’s veto means that a national forum must agree 
to propose the amendment and it can choose not to do so. This is 
an important power. 
Dellinger also argues that the Framers would not have 
intended a convention limited to a specifically worded 
amendment, because calling and holding the convention would 
have involved a great deal of work just to vote on a 
predetermined amendment.119 
This argument, however, suffers from two problems. First, it 
seems problematic to argue that a convention limited to a 
specifically worded amendment would not be worth the effort. 
As discussed, that convention has a crucial role—it is the sole 
national institution that reviews the proposed amendment and it 
has the power to veto the proposed amendment. Thus, the 
convention’s role seems important enough to justify its 
existence. While this convention does not do any drafting, that 
does not mean its function is unimportant. The Constitution 
employs state ratifying conventions, which also do no drafting, 
and no one believes that is odd or inappropriate. 
Second, Dellinger focuses only on a convention limited to a 
specifically worded amendment. But the Framers did not restrict 
the states to applying only for this type of convention. Rather, 
they also allowed the states to apply for an unlimited convention 
or a convention limited to a subject. Thus, the question is not 
whether it would have made sense for the Framers to have 
established a procedure only for conventions limited to 
specifically worded amendments, but instead whether it would 
have made sense to have allowed the states to call either an 
unlimited convention, a convention limited to a general subject, 
or a convention limited to a specifically worded amendment. 
This convention method makes perfect sense, since it allows the 
state legislatures to decide what type of convention the 
particular circumstances required. 
 
 118. In fact, this veto is much stronger than the President’s, since it is absolute veto 
that cannot be overridden.  
 119. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1632–33. 
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 2. Congress’s Alleged Excessive Power 
Having shown that the debates at the Philadelphia 
Convention do not suggest that the Framers would have 
opposed a convention limited to a specifically worded 
amendment, we can now turn to Dellinger’s claims about a 
convention limited to a subject. Dellinger argues that a 
convention limited to a sufficiently broad subject might avoid 
the problems discussed above, but would suffer from another 
problem. If the different states apply for a single convention 
limited to a subject, but submit applications with differing 
language, then this will require the Congress to determine 
whether the states have applied for the same convention and, if 
so, to determine what the limits of that convention are.120 
Dellinger argues that the Framers would not have intended for 
Congress to have this power, because the purpose of the 
convention method was to provide an amendment method that 
did not require Congress’s consent and Congress might abuse its 
power in an effort to sabotage an amendment. Once again, there 
are several serious problems with Dellinger’s argument. 
First, Dellinger’s argument that the Framers would not have 
desired the Congress to be involved in determining what limits 
the states had applied for is unsupported. The Framers, of 
course, do not discuss the specific issue. Although initially it 
might seem reasonable to infer that the Framers would have 
always desired Congress to have less power, that is not 
necessarily the case. The Philadelphia Convention did not 
entirely strip Congress from participating in the convention 
process. Congress is clearly given the role of calling the 
convention, which requires that it decide a host of matters. Even 
under the unlimited convention view that Dellinger assumes, 
Congress must make numerous decisions, including how long 
state applications for a convention last, whether states can 
withdraw their applications, whether applications sent to the 
wrong place count, whether state applications that have not 
received the approval of the governor count, whether applica-
tions that seek a limited convention should be counted for an 
unlimited convention, whether Congress can regulate the voting 
rule at the convention, whether Congress can regulate the 
 
 120. For example, if some states apply for a convention that will propose an 
amendment that limits debt, and other states apply for one that will propose a limit on 
debt and taxes, the Congress will have to determine whether they have applied for the 
same convention and, if so, to determine whether that convention can make a proposal 
limiting taxation.  
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number of delegates from each state, and whether Congress can 
regulate the method of appointing or electing convention 
delegates.121 In addition, Congress is expressly given the power to 
decide whether the proposed amendment should be ratified by 
state legislatures or conventions.122 
Thus, the Framers did not uniformly disfavor a 
congressional role. Rather, they gave Congress a limited role, 
appearing to allow Congress to act when the Framers believed 
the advantages outweighed the costs. Since it is quite possible 
that the Framers believed that having a limited convention was 
worth the additional congressional involvement, Dellinger has 
not pointed to anything in the convention debates to suggest the 
Framers would not have allowed for limited conventions. 
Second, even if one assumes that the Philadelphia 
Convention did want to minimize Congress’s ability to block 
amendments under the convention method, the delegates still 
might have adopted the limited convention view. Although the 
limited convention view might give Congress more of a role, the 
dangers from that additional role might be outweighed by the 
problems created by allowing only unlimited conventions. Under 
the unlimited convention view, state legislatures may fear 
applying for unlimited conventions out of the concern that such 
conventions might propose amendments the state legislatures 
strongly oppose. If that fear leaves the convention method 
ineffective, then Congress would have more ability to block 
amendments under the unlimited convention view than under 
the limited convention view, because the only workable 
convention method would be the congressional proposal 
method. Thus, one cannot even infer that the Framers would 
have adopted the unlimited convention view had they been 
solely focused on minimizing Congress’s ability to obstruct 
amendments. 
Finally, the case for concluding that the Framers would have 
opposed limited conventions is further weakened when one 
recognizes that the harm to the convention method from 
congressional involvement is much smaller than Dellinger 
suggests. Under the limited convention view, the states have a 
 
 121. See CAPLAN, supra note 3, at 105–14, 146–49. 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. V. Congress’s power to decide on the ratification method is a 
significant power. Not only is the method important for influencing whether a proposed 
amendment will be ratified; it is also subject to abuse because Congress might fail to 
choose a ratification method, which might cause an amendment never to be ratified.  
!!!RAPPAPORT-281-CONSTITUTIONALITYOFALIMITEDCONVENTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012  3:19 PM 
108 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 81:53 
 
choice. If they believe that the risk of Congress acting 
improperly is too great, they can always choose to apply for an 
unlimited convention, which would leave them in the same place 
that Dellinger’s interpretation would. But if they believe the 
risks are small enough—or the benefits outweigh this risk—then 
they can apply for a convention limited to a subject. Moreover, 
to reduce the risks of Congress abusing its power, the different 
states can all agree to use the same language to describe the 
subject. Given that the states have a choice under the limited 
convention view as to what type of convention to apply for, one 
might actually argue that they are unambiguously better off 
under that view, since they can always choose to apply for an 
unlimited convention. One might, then, reach the further 
conclusion that the harm from the unlimited convention view to 
the Framers’ purpose of allowing amendments to be enacted 
without a congressional obstacle is small indeed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 This Article has re-examined the question of whether the 
Constitution authorizes limited conventions. I have argued that 
the Constitution’s original public meaning allows the state 
legislatures to apply for a convention limited either to a subject 
or to a specifically worded amendment, that Congress must then 
respond to that application by calling for a limited convention, 
and that the convention must then follow the limitations of that 
call. The conclusions I have reached here do depart from those 
of most of the commentators who discussed the issue in the 
1960s and 1970s, as well as some since then. But as I have tried 
to show, their conclusions were based on a mistaken under-
standing of the original meaning.  
 If my argument is correct, it shows that a significant 
problem with the constitutional amendment process—that the 
only method for enacting amendments, that does not require 
Congress’s consent, does not work—is not primarily the fault of 
the Constitution’s drafters and ratifers. Rather, it is the 
responsibility of interpreters who have failed to follow the 
original meaning. If the correct understanding of the original 
meaning were widely accepted in the legal academy, that would 
bring us one step closer to a workable noncongressional 
amendment process. Taking the next step, however, would be 
harder. It would involve generating a sufficiently strong 
consensus among politicians, judges, and lawyers that limited 
conventions are constitutional, so that state legislators would 
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have the confidence that their application for a limited 
convention would not result in a runaway convention. 
Unfortunately, it is at present difficult to imagine getting to that 
point, but stranger things have happened. 
